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Introduction 
The law on legal affiliation or parentage determines who the legal parents of a child 
are and/or how legal parenthood is established and annulled. The law on legal 
affiliation does not deal with the consequences of the existence of legal affiliation, 
such as parental responsibility, inheritance and maintenance. Together with the law on 
marriage, the law on legal affiliation is at the heart of family law in European legal 
systems, since broadly speaking, marriage and affiliation define the legal family.  
Since the national rules on legal affiliation influence the family life of the 
individuals involved, they have to withstand the scrutiny of Article 8 European 
Convention of Human Rights (hereafter: ECHR) which guarantees the respect for 
private and family life. In the field of legal affiliation, landmark cases of the European 
Court of Human Rights (hereafter: the European Court) on Article 8 ECHR, like 
Marckx
3 and Keegan,4 are generally understood to have had a converging effect on 
the law on legal affiliation in Europe. In this paper we will explore exactly in which 
matters the European Court has been active and to what extent the European Court’s 
case law leaves room for divergent national laws on legal affiliation. 
Our starting-point is the assumption that in order to determine the harmonising 
effect of the case law of the European Court, one has to analyse to what extent the 
supranational legal order, in this case Article 8 ECHR as interpreted by the European 
Court, allows for differences among the national legal systems. The degree of 
convergence of national laws on legal affiliation is determined by the leeway for 
which the legal order of the ECHR allows. In order to examine this leeway we will 
first analyse the differences between national laws regarding legal affiliation. This 
will involve setting out the whole scope of the law of affiliation. After that, it will be 
examined which parts of the national laws on legal affiliation are affected by the 
European Court’s case law and which parts are not. In the third part, a conclusion will 
be drawn regarding the tendency in the law on legal affiliation towards harmonisation 
or divergence. 
                                                           
3 Marckx v Belgium, Eur. Court H.R., 13th June 1979, Series A no. 31. 
4
 Keegan v Ireland, Eur. Court H. R., 26th May 1995, Series A no. 291. 
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1. National laws on legal affiliation: how do they differ? 
1.1 A model for the comparison on national laws on legal affiliation 
In this part it will be examined how the national laws on legal affiliation differ in 
relation to each other. It is submitted on the basis of a study of the national laws on 
legal affiliation in England & Wales, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden, 
that the national legal systems in Europe can be analysed with a general model which 
consists of three layers. The three layers represent the steps a hypothetical legislator 
would have to take were it to legislate for the first time on the question of legal 
parenthood. First of all, the hypothetical legislator would have to ask who, in the 
abstract, should be the parents of the child. At this stage, the ground for legal 
affiliation is formulated. The reply to the question would probably be something like: 
in case of natural reproduction the child ideally should be affiliated with his or her 
genetic parents but some interests might require that in a concrete case that this is not 
the case. The formulation of these interests is the second step. The interests are 
reflected in the system of establishment and annulment of legal parenthood. 
Therefore, the second stage is concerned with establishment and annulment of legal 
parenthood. If the hypothetical legislator has determined the starting-point for a 
regulation on legal affiliation and if it has determined the interests which, in a 
concrete case, allow for a deviation from that starting-point, the legislator has to come 
up with a system to translate the legal reality into tangible evidence, which will 
probably be a piece of paper (birth certificate, instrument of civil status, judgement 
and so on) explaining the legal situation. Hence, the third step our hypothetical 
legislator would have to take is to come up with a system for providing evidence of 
legal parenthood. 
Based on these steps, the first layer of the model is the starting-point or 
ground which a national legislator has taken in its national law on legal affiliation. It 
will be explained below that most national legal systems have two or three grounds 
for legal affiliation which apply in carefully-defined circumstances. The second layer 
is the establishment and the annulment of legal affiliation in a concrete case. It will be 
explained that there are various methods to establish legal parenthood and that some 
of these methods allow for a certain possibility that legal parenthood is not established 
in conformity with the starting-point for legal affiliation in a national legal system. 
This result can, in certain circumstances, be remedied by an action for annulment of 
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parenthood. The extent to which the mode of establishment of legal parenthood 
together with the action for annulment of legal parenthood allow for a deviation from 
the starting-point in a national legal system, reveals the additional interests which the 
legislature chooses to honour. The legislature can choose to honour public interests 
such as stability of personal status or the preservation of the traditional family and 
private interests such as the child’s interests or the biological or social parents’ 
interest. The third layer concerns the system of evidence of (legal) affiliation in and 
out of court. ‘Legal’ is put between brackets here, because it will be shown that, 
depending on the relationship between the first and the second layer in a national legal 
system, one may or may not have to prove legal affiliation or some other kind of 
affiliation (e.g. genetic affiliation). 
 In the following section, the model will be explained separately for legal 
maternity and legal paternity. Legal paternity should be understood broadly as the 
second parent additional to the mother, since for example in Sweden the lesbian 
partner of the mother can become the child’s second mother by means of the Swedish 
rules on legal affiliation.  
It is submitted that the difference between legal systems at the first level 
results in the most profound differences between national laws on the establishment of 
parenthood. After all, a difference at the first level means that legal systems differ as 
to who should be the legal parent of the child in abstracto. It will appear that legal 
systems differ regarding the starting-point of their laws on legal affiliation. Since 
these differences have been maintained or even reinforced in the course of recent 
national modifications, it seems that at a national level we are diverging, especially 
when it comes to the consequences of assisted reproduction. 
1.2. Grounds for legal affiliation 
The ground or grounds for legal affiliation in a national legal system are the central 
idea or ideas around which the rules on legal affiliation are built. It concerns central 
ideas on who should be the parent of a child for legal purposes. An obvious question 
is how one finds the ground for legal affiliation in a certain national legal system. 
Unfortunately no legislator works as systematically as the hypothetical legislator 
described above. The answer is therefore that it depends on the legal system involved. 
Sometimes the grounds are stated expressly in the law of the legal system involved, as 
is done in Sweden for cases involving assisted reproduction. Sometimes the grounds 
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have to be derived from the provisions on judicial establishment of legal parenthood 
and annulment of legal parenthood, as is the case in France, Germany and the 
Netherlands. In that case, it is submitted that the fact that has to be proved (e.g. 
genetic affiliation or consent to fertility treatment) in order to establish or annul legal 
parenthood is the central idea for the purpose of the proposed model. This point needs 
some further explanation. 
How do we know that the central idea of a legal system is found by peeling 
away the provisions on judicial establishment and annulment of legal parenthood? 
The answer is that we don’t. Concepts like ‘starting point’ or ‘ground’ are not 
something which is used by the respective legislators. The fact that most legislators 
did not work according to the model which has been described above already 
indicates that they were probably not aware of something like a ground for legal 
affiliation and additional interests on the basis of which one can deviate from that 
ground. They were simply craftsmen taking up their task employing the tools which 
had been handed down by previous legislators. The central idea or the ground for 
legal affiliation are concepts which have been invented in order to be able to create a 
model which fits all the national laws into the present comparison. Consequently, the 
model only presents a certain perspective on what is out there in the different legal 
systems on legal affiliation. Although the model does not represent the absolute truth, 
its formulation is not at all gratuitous. On the one hand, it should fit all the legal 
systems in order to facilitate the comparison, but, on the other hand, it should give a 
fair impression of the actual content of the legal systems considered. 
1.2.1. Grounds for legal maternity 
A study of the laws on legal affiliation in England & Wales, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands and Sweden reveals that there are two grounds for the establishment of 
legal maternity: childbirth and social affiliation (apparent status or possession d’état). 
Legal systems differ as to which grounds they use and to which situations a certain 
ground applies. 
1.2.1.1. Childbirth 
Childbirth is the ground for legal maternity in the case of natural reproduction and 
assisted reproduction in all legal systems involved. Under Dutch and German law this 
ground follows directly from the Civil Code itself, which states that the woman who 
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gives birth to the child shall be the child’s legal mother.5 The same holds true for 
English6 and Swedish law.7  
The French Civil Code does not expressly provide who should be the legal 
mother of the child. It only provides how legal maternity can be established and 
annulled: legal maternity under French law is defined formally, not substantially. 
However, it is apparent from the provisions of the Civil Code that the legislative aim 
is to establish the legal maternity of the woman who gave birth to the child. First, 
Article 332 French Civil Code states that legal maternity can be annulled if it is 
proved that the legal mother did not give birth to the child. Second, Article 55 French 
Civil Code states that the birth has to be declared within three days after the birth of 
the child, which indicates that the woman who gives birth to the child should be 
mentioned in the birth register as the child’s mother. However, it should be mentioned 
immediately that the birthmother will not in all cases indeed be the legal mother of the 
child, as will explained below, at 1.3. 
 It could be argued that childbirth in fact is not really the essence of the law on 
legal affiliation. One could argue that in case of natural reproduction legal maternity 
is based on genetic affiliation and that in case of differentiated maternity, i.e. the case 
where the woman who carries the child is not the child’s genetic mother, the legislator 
based legal maternity on the intention of the birthmother to get the child. However, it 
turns out that in the legal systems under consideration legal maternity is only based on 
intention if the birthmother is not the genetic mother of the child. The intention of the 
genetic mother in such a case is not honoured in any of the legal systems involved, at 
least not immediately.8 From the parliamentary history of legislation on parenthood in 
                                                           
5 Article 1:198 Dutch Civil Code; Article 1591 German Civil Code.  
6 In case of natural reproduction, or, more specifically, in cases to which the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990 does not apply, childbirth as a ground for legal maternity follows from the 
Ampthill Peerage Case [1977] A.C. 547, at 577. Also S.M. Cretney e.a., Principles of Family Law, 
London: Sweet & Maxwell (2003), p. 523. In case of assisted reproduction Article 27 Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 also provides that the woman who gives birth to the child shall 
be the child’s legal mother. 
7 Swedish law has no specific provisions on legal maternity in the situation of natural reproduction. It 
was considered self-evident that the woman who gives birth to the child was the child’s mother. The 
fact that the woman who gives birth to the child is the child’s legal mother has to be derived from the 
Registration Act (Folkbokföringslag (1991:481)), which links the registration of parents directly to the 
birth of the child (Socialstyrelsen, Att fastställa faderskap, Stockholm: Elanders Gotab (2005), p. 105). 
Nowadays Article 1:7 of the Föräldrabalk (1949:381) (Children and Parents Code) provides that if a 
woman gives birth to a child who has been created with the ovum of another woman, the woman who 
gives birth to the child shall be considered to be the child’s mother . 
8 Under English law the genetic mother can acquire parental rights under certain circumstances, but 
even under English law the guiding rule is that the birth mother is the child’s mother (cf. Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, section 27 and 30ff). 
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the last few years in, for example, the Netherlands and Germany, it appears that the 
rule that the birth mother is always the legal mother is meant to discourage or ban 
surrogacy constructions.9 It seems that the act of giving birth is strongly connected 
with the idea of maternity and therefore intention is probably not an essential concept 
in case of legal maternity and assisted reproduction. 
1.2.1.2. Apparent status or possession d’état 
The second ground for legal affiliation is apparent status.10 The concept of apparent 
status or possession d’état is typical for French law on legal affiliation, but it also 
exists in other legal systems, such as the Dutch legal system, which have been 
influenced by French law. Possession d’état literally means possession of status. One 
possesses a certain status by exercising the rights and performing the duties associated 
with a certain personal status. Here possession d’état has been translated as apparent 
status, since the personal status one possesses is determined by apparent facts. If a 
child has a certain apparent status, it means that from apparent facts it appears that a 
certain man or woman is the (legal) father or mother of the child. Such facts are that 
the child is being raised and supported by the man and the woman, that the child bears 
their name and that society in general and the administration considers the man and 
the woman to be the child’s legal parents.11 This is not the place to explain the ins and 
outs of the concept of apparent status.12 What is important is that apparent status is not 
dependent on genetic affiliation: one can have the apparent status of being a certain 
person’s child, without being the genetic child of that person.13  
Apparent status is only a qualification of a certain fact-pattern and as such the 
concept is universal. However, the function it has differs among the countries that use 
the concept. For example, under Dutch law the concept is only used to prevent actions 
for annulment of legal affiliation.14 The rationale behind that Dutch rule is that if 
apparent status indicates that a certain person is the child’s legal mother or father, 
apparently a certain social reality has crystallised and it is deemed undesirable to 
                                                           
9 Germany : BR Drucks. 180/96, p. 92 and BT Drucks. 13/4899, p. 82. The Netherlands: Second 
Chamber, 1995/96, 24 649, nr. 3 (explanatory report), p. 7 
10 Also A. Bénabent, Droit civil la famille, Paris: Litec (2001), nr. 580. 
11 Cf. Article 311-1 French Civil Code. 
12 For an exhaustive explanation of apparent status under French law: V. Morgand-Cantegrit, La 
possession d'état d'enfant, Thèse Université de Lille II Droit et Santé (1993). See also D. Huet-Weiler, 
‘L'établissment de la filiation par la possession d'état’, Recueil Dalloz Sirey (1982), 185-192; M. 
Rèmond-Gouilloud, ‘La possession d'état d'enfant’, Revue Trimestrelle de Droit Civil (1975), 459-481. 
13 Cf. P. Malaurie & H. Fulchiron, Droit civil: La famille, Paris: Défrenois (2006), p. 387. 
14 Article 1:209 Dutch Civil Code. 
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disrupt that social reality.15 Under French law apparent status even has the function of 
a ground for establishment of legal affiliation for the same reason; according to the 
French legislator social reality should be clearly reflected in the legal situation.16 
Therefore, if under French law the apparent status of a child is that he or she is the 
legal child of a certain woman, that woman is by dint of  that very fact the child’s 
legal mother, provided that the apparent status has been recorded in an affidavit.17 On 
the basis of this assertion it would still be possible to argue that apparent status is only 
a means of establishing legal maternity. However, legal maternity based on the 
existence of apparent status cannot be annulled by proving that the legal mother did 
not give birth to the child: the applicant has to prove that the child’s apparent status at 
the moment legal maternity was established did not indicate that the woman in 
question was the child’s legal mother.18  
1.2.1.3. The relationship between genetic affiliation and apparent status under French 
law 
The fact of coexistence of two grounds for legal maternity under French law, raises 
the question as to when apparent status is a ground for legal affiliation and when 
childbirth is such a ground. There is no distinctive fact-pattern for genetic affiliation 
and apparent status; both can apply in the same case, but not together. This follows 
from the system of French law on affiliation. Article 310-1 French Civil Code 
provides that legal affiliation is established by registration, acknowledgement, 
apparent status or judicial establishment. Apparent status can only serve as a means to 
establish legal affiliation if the existence of apparent status has been recorded either in 
an affidavit (Article 310-1 in conjunction with Article 317 French Civil Code) or in a 
judgment (Article 330 French Civil Code). Legal affiliation based on apparent status 
can be annulled on the basis of Article 335 French Civil Code, if it has been recorded 
                                                           
15 On apparent status under Dutch law see K. Saarloos, ‘Bezit van staat of het wormvormige 
aanhangsel van het Nederlandse afstammingsrecht?’ Weekblad voor privaatrecht, notariaat en 
registratie 2006, p. 123-129.  
16 On the role of apparent status and the importance of ‘social affiliation’ in French law see F. 
Dekeuwer-Defossez (e.a.), Rénover le droit de la famille: propositions pour un droit adapté aux 
réalités et aux aspirations de notre temps, Paris : La documentation française (1999) and I. Théry, 
Couple, filiation et parenté aujourd'hui: le droit face aux mutations de la famille et de la vie privée, 
Paris : La documentation française (1998). 
17 Article 310-1 French Civil Code. 
18 Article 335 French Civil Code. See also F. Granet-Lambrechts & J. Hauser, ‘Le nouveau droit de la 
filiation’, Recueil Dalloz 2006, p 17-28, at p. 23. However, Massip states that legal affiliation on the 
basis of apparent status can also be annulled by proving the absence of genetic affiliation (J. Massip, Le 
nouveau droit de la filiation, Paris: Défrenois (2006), p. 57). Cf P. Malaurie & H. Fulchiron, Droit 
civil: La famille, Paris: Défrenois (2006), p. 571. 
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in an affidavit. According to Article 320 French Civil Code, the establishment of legal 
affiliation is not possible if legal affiliation with another person already exists. In that 
case, the first relationship has to be annulled before a new relationship can be 
established. In other words, it is not possible to establish legal maternity by means of 
apparent status if the child has been acknowledged by another woman and if that 
acknowledgment has not been annulled. This does not mean that apparent status as 
such cannot exist in such a case. On the contrary, it is possible that woman X first 
acknowledged the child, but that the child later on develops apparent status with 
woman Y. In that case, the apparent status does not establish the legal maternity of 
woman Y. The only consequence is that the acknowledgment of the child by woman 
X is easier to annul: if the acknowledgment is not in conformity with the apparent 
status everyone with an interest can apply for annulment of the acknowledgment 
within ten years of the date of the acknowledgment (Article 334 French Civil Code). 
If the acknowledgment is in conformity with the child’s apparent status, the 
acknowledgment can only be annulled upon application by the child, the legal parents 
or the person who claims to be the child’s biological parent. These persons have to 
apply before the acknowledgment and the apparent status have been in conformity for 
five years (Article 333 French Civil Code). 
1.2.2. Grounds for legal paternity 
The grounds for legal paternity are far more complicated to describe than the grounds 
for legal maternity. First, it is submitted that, in the legal systems which have been 
examined in this study, there are three grounds for legal affiliation: genetic affiliation, 
intention and apparent status. However, not only do legal systems differ according to 
whether or not these grounds are used at all in the laws on legal affiliation, but they 
also differ as to the situations in which the grounds apply. For example, under all 
legal systems intention is a ground for legal affiliation if the child has been born as a 
result of fertility treatment. However, not all legal systems define the scope of 
application of the rules on legal affiliation in case of fertility treatment in the same 
way. Moreover, in a model which aims to fit all the legal systems under consideration, 
it is formally not correct to speak of legal paternity. After all, as explained above, 
under Swedish law the second parent (apart from the mother) can, under certain 
circumstances, also be female if she is the mother’s consenting partner and if the 
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fertility treatment took place within the framework of Swedish law.19 This paragraph 
will discuss genetic affiliation and intention as a ground for legal parenthood. 
Apparent status as a ground for legal paternity will not be discussed here. It is only a 
ground for legal paternity under French law and the discussion on apparent status as a 
ground for legal maternity applies equally to legal paternity. 
1.2.2.1. Genetic affiliation 
In the case of natural reproduction, genetic affiliation is the ground for legal paternity 
in all the five legal systems under consideration. Under English law this proposition 
follows from the unwritten rules of common law.20 In the other legal systems the 
proposition has to be derived from the grounds for judicial establishment and 
annulment of legal paternity: in case of natural reproduction, all legal systems provide 
that one has to prove either the existence or the absence (depending on the action) of 
genetic affiliation.21 
1.2.2.2. Intention 
Intention as a ground for legal affiliation is less straightforward than genetic 
affiliation. The deployment of intention as a ground implies that the intention as such 
to become the parent of a child is sufficient to actually become the legal parent, 
without it being possible to annul the legal parenthood on the basis of another ground. 
Therefore voluntary acknowledgment of paternity in case of natural reproduction in 
this model is not based on intention, although in most legal systems acknowledgment 
of paternity only requires that the acknowledger has full legal capacity (as for all legal 
acts) in order for the acknowledgement to be effective; the validity of the 
acknowledgment does not depend on the genetic reality. However, it is important that 
                                                           
19 Article 1:9 Children and Parents Code (1949:381).The possibility for the lesbian partner of the 
mother to become the child’s legal mother has been inserted by Act SFS 2005:434 and entered into 
force on the 1st of July 2005. On the Swedish law see i.a. M. Jänterä-Jareborg, ‘Sweden: Lesbian 
couples are entitled to assisted fertilisation and to equal rights of parentage’, Zeitschrift für das gesamte 
Familienrecht (2006), p. 1329-1330. 
20 S.M. Cretney e.a., Principles of Family Law, London: Sweet & Maxwell (2003), p. 524; Halsbury's 
Laws of England, Children and Young Persons, London: Butterworths (2001), par. 93, p. 54. 
21 Articles 327 and 332 French Civil Code, Article 1599 (1) German Civil Code (German law does not 
specify the ground for judicial establishment of paternity, but it is generally accepted that in case of 
judicial establishment of paternity under German law, it has to be proved that the respondent is the 
child’s genetic father (Staudinger’s Kommentar zum BGB, Part IV/Rauscher, Berlin: Sellier – de 
Gruyter (2004), p. 474; Münchener Kommentar zum BGB Volume 8/Seidel (2002), p. 224), Articles 
1:200 (1), 1:205 (1) and Art. 1:207 Dutch Civil Code and Articles 1:2, 1:4 (3) and 1:5 Swedish 
Children and Parents Code (1949:381). 
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it is at least presumed that the acknowledger is the child’s genetic father.22 This 
presumption is evidenced by the fact that, apart from cases of assisted reproduction, 
the acknowledgment can be annulled if it is not in conformity with genetic reality.23 
The fact that the action for annulment of acknowledgment is severely restricted under 
some legal systems does not weaken the point now being made. After all, it is 
submitted that the restrictions on an action for annulment of acknowledgment are 
imposed by the fact that in that legal system genetic affiliation is not a goal in itself 
but merely a starting-point. The establishment of legal affiliation by means of the 
acknowledgment of parenthood will be explained in more detail below. 
 Intention within the meaning of this model is the ground for the establishment 
of legal paternity in case of assisted reproduction in all legal systems under 
consideration except under Dutch and German law.  
Under English24 and Swedish law25 the law provides explicitly that intention is 
a ground for legal affiliation. The fact that intention is a ground for legal paternity 
under French law has to be inferred from the law on legal affiliation. In particular, it 
can be inferred from Article 311-20 French Civil Code which explicitly provides that 
legal paternity cannot be annulled if the legal father consented to the assisted 
reproduction even if he is not the child’s genetic father. Moreover, that article also 
provides that the man who consented to the assisted reproduction is obliged to 
acknowledge paternity. 
Under Dutch and German law intention as such is not a ground for legal 
paternity, since the child is able to annul legal paternity if the man is not the child’s 
genetic father, even if the man consented to the fertility treatment. Under these rules 
only the legal mother and father are barred from applying for annulment of legal 
                                                           
22 For the Netherlands see: Kamerstukken II 2004/05, 28 457 and 26 672, nr. 23, p. 3; : A.J.M. 
Nuytinck, ‘Het gezag over minderjarige kinderen en de andere levensgezel’ Weekblad voor 
Privaatrecht, Notariaat en Registratie 2006, p. 885-888, p. 887; Asser/de Boer (2002), p. 632; S. 
Wortmann, ‘Sekseneutraal afstammingsrecht?’ Tijdschrift voor familie- en jeugdrecht 2001, p. 231-
236, p. 235; A. Willems, ‘Adoptie door homo-ouders en de positie van de spermadonor’ Tijdschrift 
voor familie- en jeugdrecht 2000, p. 226-229, p. 228; P. Vlaardingerbroek, ‘Adoptie door paren van 
gelijk geslacht’ Tijdschrift voor familie- en jeugdrecht 2000, p. 198-202; Rapport Commissie inzake 
openstelling van het burgerlijk huwelijk voor personen van hetzelfde geslacht, Den Haag, October 
1997, p. 7. 
23 Germany: Article 1599 German Civil Code; France: Article 332 French Civil Code; the Netherlands: 
Article 1:205 Dutch Civil Code; Sweden: Article 1:4 Children and Parents Code (1949:381). In English 
law acknowledgment of paternity does not exist as such since legal parenthood always exists ex lege 
(see below). 
24 Section 27 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. 
25 Article 1:6 and 1:8 Children and Parents Code (1949:381). 
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paternity if the legal father consented to the assisted reproduction.26 The reason given 
for this rule under German law is that the child has a constitutionally protected right 
to know its genetic origins.27 Under Dutch law it is possible to obtain information 
regarding one’s genetic ancestors without it being necessary to establish legal 
affiliation with the genetic parents.28  
There are further indications that intention is not a ground for legal affiliation 
under Dutch and German law. Under Dutch law, the fact that the acknowledger 
consented to the assisted reproduction is not, as such, a bar to an application by the 
child’s legal parents for annulment of the acknowledgment. The only ground for 
annulment of acknowledgment under Dutch law is that the acknowledger is not the 
child’s biological father.29 This submission should, however, be refined. First, the 
child’s legal parents are only allowed to apply for annulment of acknowledgment if 
they can show that, at the moment of the acknowledgment, they lacked capacity either 
to acknowledge or to consent.30 Moreover, should an applicant actually pass this 
hurdle, the annulment of acknowledgment against the mother’s or child’s will would 
be without effect, since the mother and child have the possibility to reverse the 
annulment by exercising their right to apply for judicial establishment of his legal 
paternity on the basis of Article 1:207 Dutch Civil Code. So, although the parent’s 
right to apply for annulment of acknowledgment exists if the acknowledger, although 
not the genetic father of the child, consented to the assisted reproduction, this right is 
certainly not unconditional.  
The fact that intention is not a ground for legal affiliation under German law is 
furthermore demonstrated by the fact that judicial establishment of paternity on the 
basis that the man consented to the assisted reproduction is not possible. Only the 
paternity of the genetic father can be judicially established.31 
                                                           
26 Article 1600 (4) German Civil Code; Articles 1:200 (3) and 1: 205 (1) Dutch Civil Code. 
27 J. Gernhuber & D. Coester-Waltjen, Familienrecht, München: Verlag C.H. Beck (2006), p. 627. 
28 On the right to know one’s genetic affiliation under Dutch law: J. de Boer, Asser’s Personen en 
Familierecht, Deventer: Kluwer (2002), p. 496; C. J. Forder, Legal Establishment of the Parent-Child 
Relationship: Constitutional Principles in Dutch, English and German Law, having Regard to the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Other 
Applicable Instruments, Maastricht, 1995, p. 126-139. Independent of the legal affiliation status of the 
child, the child can obtain information about his or her genetic affiliation under the Donor Information 
Act 2002 (Wet donorgegevens kunstmatige bevruchting, Stb. 2002, 240).  
29 Article 1:205 (1) Dutch Civil Code. 
30 Article 1:205 (1) under b and c Dutch Civil Code. 
31 See note 21.  
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 So far we have seen that, under all legal systems reviewed, intention is not a 
ground for the establishment of legal affiliation. However, even among the legal 
systems according to which intention is a ground for legal affiliation, the application 
of the ground is not the same. Legal systems which use intention as a ground for legal 
affiliation use it differently. Firstly, the field of application of intention as a ground 
for legal affiliation differs among between countries involved. Secondly, the elements 
which are required to constitute a valid expression of the intention differ. These 
differences will be explored in more detail. 
a. Definition of the field of application of intention as a ground for legal affiliation 
In order to determine the field of application of intention as a ground for legal 
affiliation the field of application of the rules on the consequences of assisted 
reproduction for the legal affiliation status of the child must be defined. The reason is 
that intention as a ground for legal affiliation only exists in cases where the child has 
been born as a result of assisted reproduction. However, not all the provisions which 
have been enacted to regulate the consequences of assisted reproduction can be taken 
to signify that intention has been accepted as a ground for legal affiliation. We have 
already shown that under Dutch and German law this is not the case. Accordingly, a 
definition of the field of application of the national provisions regarding the 
consequences of assisted reproduction in all the countries under consideration is, 
strictly spoken, not necessary. However, the scope of application of the Dutch and 
German provisions on assisted reproduction will be discussed nonetheless, for the 
sake of completeness.  
 Under Dutch law, the rule that the consenting husband cannot annul marital 
paternity (Art.1:200 (3) Dutch Civil Code) and the rule that the paternity of the 
consenting partner can be judicially established (Article 1:207 Dutch Civil Code) 
applies in all cases where the mother’s partner consented to the conception of the 
child, even if the conception took place naturally. It should be stressed that the 
provisions are not confined to consent to assisted reproduction. This follows from 
Article 1:200 Dutch Civil Code which provides that the legal paternity of the mother’s 
husband cannot be annulled if he consented to the act which could have resulted in the 
procreation of the child and Article 1:207 Dutch Civil Code, which provides that legal 
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paternity can be established on the same basis if the man was the partner of the child’s 
mother at the moment at which he consented.32  
Under French law, the field of application of intention as ground for legal 
affiliation is narrower than under Dutch law. It applies to all cases where the child has 
been born as a result of medically-assisted fertility treatment with donor semen 
(procréation médicalement assistée avec tiers donneur).33 If the child is not born as a 
result of fertility treatment with donor semen, genetic affiliation is the ground for 
legal paternity under French law. Hence, if the child is born after private 
insemination, i.e. without medical assistance, intention will not be a ground for legal 
affiliation under French law. This does not mean, however, that the private donor 
cannot, in a concrete case, become the child’s legal parent, but it means that the 
establishment of him as the child’s father will be susceptible to annulment.  
Although German law does not recognise intention as a ground for legal 
affiliation, a specific consequence is nevertheless attached to the fact that a child has 
been born as a result of assisted reproduction. Article 1600 (4) German Civil Code 
provides that the child’s legal father and mother are not allowed to apply for 
annulment of legal paternity if the legal father consented to the fertility treatment. 
However, since it is not possible to judicially establish that the consenting partner is 
the child’s father, the field of application is limited to the situation in which the child 
is born to a married couple or to the situation in which the consenting partner became 
the legal parent through voluntary acknowledgement of paternity.  
English law, moreover, has its own peculiar definition of the scope of 
application for intention as a ground for legal affiliation. The provisions on the 
consequences of assisted reproduction on the legal affiliation of the child, contained 
in the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, only apply if the child is born 
as a result of the placement of an embryo or of sperm and ova in the woman’s uterus 
or as a result of artificial insemination.34 Moreover, if the treatment is provided to an 
unmarried couple the rule only applies if the treatment took place in a licenced 
                                                           
32 ‘The act which could have resulted in the conception of the child’ should be correctly understood. In 
a decision of the 7th of February 2003 (NJ 2003/358), the Dutch Supreme Court held that the husband 
who consented to and encouraged his wife to commit acts of prostitution could not annul the 
relationship of legal paternity between himself and the child born as a result of the prostitution. 
According to the Supreme Court, the husband consented to an act which could have resulted in the 
conception of the child.  
33 Article 311-20 French Code Civil. 
34 Articles 27 and 28 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. 
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hospital within the meaning of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990.35 
Hence, if the treatment took place abroad and was provided to an unmarried couple, 
intention cannot provide a ground for legal affiliation. In fact, it will be impossible to 
establish that the male consenting partner was the father of the child born in 
consequence of the treatment. Whether genetic affiliation is a ground for legal 
affiliation in such a case depends on who provided the sperm which was used for the 
treatment. If the sperm comes from a sperm donor within the meaning of 28 (6) 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 or if the sperm of a deceased person 
has been used,36 genetic affiliation is not a ground for legal affiliation and the genetic 
father cannot be established to be the child’s father. As a consequence, the child 
remains fatherless.37 
Finally under Swedish law, the demarcation of the scope of application of 
intention as a ground for legal affiliation depends on whether the consenting partner is 
male or female. If the consenting partner is male, intention is a ground for legal 
affiliation if the child is born in consequence of insemination (insemination) or 
fertilisation of the mother’s ovum outside her body (befruktning av moderns ägg 
utförts utanför hennes kropp).38 However, if the consenting partner is female the 
treatment must take place within the Swedish legal framework for this kind of 
treatment if intention is te be treated as a ground for legal affiliation according to 
Swedish law. As a consequence of the structure of Swedish affiliation law, the female 
consenting partner can never become the legal parent if the treatment took place 
outwith the Swedish legal framework.39  
b. Differences between national provisions on the consequences of assisted reproduction 
The contents of the provisions on the consequences of assisted reproduction differ 
considerably. The provisions in the legal systems studied on the consequences of 
assisted reproduction for legal affiliation are typically built on four variables. These 
                                                           
35 Article 28 (3) under a Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. 
36 Post-mortem registration of paternity is only symbolic and does not confer any rights on the child. 
On the question of post-mortem registration of paternity see Sections 28 (5A) to (5D) and (5I) Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. On the background of the provisions and the consequence of 
the registration for the status of the child see the explanatory notes to the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology (Deceased Fathers) Act 2003, par. 4. See also N. Lowe & G. Douglas, Bromley’s Family 
Law, Oxford University Press (2007), p. 311. 
37 See also S.M. Cretney e.a., Principles of Family Law, London: Sweet & Maxwell (2003), p. 526; Lee 
& Morgan, Human Fertilisation and Embryology. Regulating the reproductive revolution, London: 
Blackstone 2001. 
38 Articles 1:6 and 1:8 Children and Parents Code (1949:381). 
39 Article 1:9 Children and Parents Code (1949:381). See also prop. 2004/05:137, p. 44. 
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variables are: the partner’s consent to the fertility treatment; the relationship between 
the mother and the consenting partner; the object of the consent; and the causal 
relationship between the approved treatment and the conception of the child and the 
spatial reach of the provisions on the consequences of assisted reproduction. 
 The first variable is the consent. A person who is not the child’s genetic parent 
will only be considered to be the parent if he or she consented to the treatment. 
However, systems differ as to the formal requirements of the consent and as to events 
which render the consent ineffective. Most countries do not require any formalities for 
the consent to be effective. This is the case in England & Wales,40 Germany41 and the 
Netherlands. In Sweden this is only the case in so far as it concerns the mother’s male 
partner.42 If the consenting partner is female, her consent has to be in writing in order 
for her to be considered the child’s parent.43 In France, the requirements for a valid 
consent are more demanding. According to Article 311-20 Code Civil the consenting 
partner will only be the legal father if his consent has been given before a judge or a 
civil law notary who has to inform the couple of the legal consequences of the 
consent.  
Another important aspect of consent concerns the circumstances under which 
the consent is deemed to be ineffective. Some legal systems have legal provisions 
which render the consent automatically ineffective. Other legal systems have formal 
requirements as to how the consent should be withdrawn and before which time. 
French law provides an example. The consent of one of the partners becomes 
ineffective if the consenting person dies or if the couple applies for divorce or any 
other comparable action. Under French law, a person can also withdraw his or her 
consent, but the withdrawal has to be in writing in order to be valid and the doctor in 
attendance has to be notified of the withdrawal. Moreover, it follows from Article 
311-20 French Civil Code that consent can only be invalidated before the treatment 
takes place. However, Dutch and German law do not contain provisions on these 
issues.  
                                                           
40 S.M. Cretney e.a., Principles of Family Law, London: Sweet & Maxwell (2003), p.525. 
41 J. Gernhuber & D. Coester-Waltjen, Familienrecht, München: Verlag C.H. Beck (2006), p. 628; 
Staudinger’s Kommentar zum BGB, Part IV/Rauscher, Berlin: Sellier – de Gruyter (2004), p. 390. 
42 A valid consent only requires that the man is able to determine his will (e.g. that he is not mentally 
ill), G. Walin, Föräldrabalken och internationell föräldrarätt, Stockholm: Norstedt (1996), p. 81.  
43 Article 1:9 Children and Parents Code (1949:381) provides that the female partner of the child’s 
mother is only the child’s legal parent if the fertility treatment took place within the framework of the 
Lag (2006:351) om genetisk integritet m.m.. Article 6:1 and 7:3 Lag (2006:351) om genetisk integritet 
m.m. provides that the consent to the fertility treatment has to be in writing.  
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 The second variable is the relationship between the consenting person and the 
mother. The question is whether there has to be a certain relationship (marriage, 
partnership etc.) between the mother and the consenting person before the consent of 
that person can serve as a basis for legal affiliation. All legal systems require that 
there is a certain relationship between the mother and the consenting person, although 
English law is ambiguous in this matter. English law provides that, if the treatment 
takes place out of wedlock, the consenting partner is only the child’s legal father if he 
and the mother received treatment together. ‘Receiving treatment together’ does not 
mean that the persons should be married or living together. What it does mean is not 
entirely clear.44 In France the couple has to be married or the man and the woman 
have to live together.45 The same holds true under the legal system of the 
Netherlands46 and Sweden.47  
 The third variable is the object of the consent and the causal relationship 
between the treatment and the conception of the child. Regarding the object, Dutch 
law is the only exception to the rule that the man should have consented to fertility 
treatment. Under Dutch law, consent is a basis for legal affiliation if the husband or 
the partner consented to the act which could have resulted in the begetting of the 
child.48 Under the laws of England & Wales, France, Germany and Sweden the 
partner has to consent to the fertility treatment. 
As to the causal relationship between the fertility treatment and the birth of the 
child in question there is more diversity. Dutch49 and Swedish law50 provide that it 
must be likely that the child was born as a result of the fertility treatment. Neither 
legal system specifies whether it is possible to prove that the child was not born in 
consequence of the treatment. English and German law is stricter; the consenting 
                                                           
44 There is some case law on the meaning of ‘receiving treatment together’. See N. Lowe & G. 
Douglas, Bromley’s Family law, Oxford University Press (2007), p. 313. See also S.M. Cretney e.a., 
Principles of Family Law, London: Sweet & Maxwell (2003), p. 525. 
45 Article 311-20 French Civil Code. 
46 Articles 1:200 and 1:207 Dutch Civil Code.  
47 Articles 1:6, 1:7 and 1:8 Children and Parents Code (1949:381). 
48 See also note 32. 
49 Articles 1:200 and 1:207 Dutch Civil Code provide that the man must have consented to the act 
which could have resulted in the conception of the child. 
50 Articles 1:6, 1:7 and 1:8 Children and Parents Code (1949:381) provide that it must have been 
sannolikt that the mother’s child has been created as a result of the fertility treatment to which the man 
(or woman) consented. Sannolikt more or less means ‘likely’. However, the term should be understood 
in its context. Sannoligt is an adjective which indicates the second highest burden of proof. The highest 
burden of proof is that the one has to prove that something is utrett (proven). On the different burdens 
of proof in Swedish law on legal affiliation see Å. Saldeen, Faststellende av faderskap, Stockholm: 
Norstedts (1980), p. 55. 
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partner is only the child’s father if the child was born as a result of fertility treatment 
to which the father consented. Hence it is possible to prove that the child was not 
conceived as a result of the agreed treatment.51 French law provides explicitly that it 
is possible to prove that the child is not the result of the fertility treatment to which 
the husband consented.  
 The fourth variable is probably the most exciting one. It concerns the spatial 
reach of the provisions regarding the consequences for legal affiliation in the context 
of assisted reproduction. In most legal systems the rules on the consequences for legal 
affiliation apply notwithstanding the place where the treatment took place. This is 
only different for parts of the English and Swedish legal system. It has been pointed 
out above that under Swedish law the consent of the mother’s female partner has to be 
in writing in order for the provisions on the consequences of assisted reproduction to 
apply. In fact, Article 1:9 Children and Parents Code (1949:381) provides that the 
whole treatment has to take place within the framework of the Swedish law on 
assisted reproduction (Lag om genetisk integritet m.m. (2006:351)) for the female 
partner to be able to become the child’s parent. Swedish law even appoints the kind of 
hospital where the treatment has to take place.52 It follows that if two Swedish women 
receive treatment abroad and if the child is born in Sweden, the mother’s female 
partner will not be considered to be the child’s mother. A similar provision is found in 
the English Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 in relation to the 
consequences of assisted reproduction out of wedlock. Section 28 (3) of the Act 
provides that the consenting partner who is not the child’s genetic father shall only be 
the legal father if the fertility treatment was provided for him and the mother together 
‘by a person to whom the licence applies’. Only institutions established in the United 
Kingdom can obtain a licence. If the treatment took place abroad, the consenting 
partner will not be considered to be the child’s legal father if he is not the genetic 
father.53  
                                                           
51 For English law: Leeds Teaching Hospital NHS Trust v. A [2003] EWHC 259 (QB), [2003] 1 FLR 
1091. The court held that the husband was not the father, since he could not be taken to have consented 
to the treatment of his wife, who was – accidentally – impregnated by someone else’s sperm. Cited in 
N. Lowe & G. Douglas, Bromley’s Family law, Oxford University Press (2007), p. 313. For German 
law see L. Müller in R. Hoppenz (ed.), Familiensachen, Heidelberg: C.F. Müller Verlag (2005), p. 537. 
Staudinger’s Kommentar zum BGB, Part IV/Rauscher, Berlin: Sellier – de Gruyter (2004), p. 392. 
52 Article 6:2 and 7:4 Lag (2006:351) om genetisk integritet m.m. 
53 N. Lowe & G. Douglas, Bromley’s Family law, Oxford University Press (2007), p. 314; Lee & 
Morgan, Human Fertilisation and Embryology. Regulating the reproductive revolution, Blackstone 
2001, p. 221. 
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1.2.3. Grounds for legal parenthood – overview 
So far we have discussed the grounds for legal affiliation under the laws of England & 
Wales, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. For the sake of clarity the 
following table gives an overview of this examination. 
Legal maternity Legal paternity (or second mother)  
Natural 
reproduction 
Assisted 
reproduction 
Natural 
reproduction 
Assisted 
reproduction54 
England & 
Wales 
Childbirth  Childbirth Genetic affiliation Intention 
France Childbirth 
Apparent status 
Childbirth 
Apparent status 
Genetic affiliation Intention 
Germany Childbirth Childbirth Genetic affiliation Genetic affiliation 
The Netherlands Childbirth Childbirth Genetic affiliation Genetic affiliation  
Sweden Childbirth Childbirth Genetic affiliation Intention 
1.3. Establishment and annulment of legal parenthood 
The previous paragraph has shown what is at the heart of a national system of legal 
affiliation. It has not shown how a person becomes the child’s legal parent. The 
establishment of legal affiliation is therefore the subject of this third paragraph. The 
establishment of legal affiliation is also the second layer in the model which we 
deploy to describe and compare the national laws on legal affiliation. This paragraph 
aims to describe two things. First, there are four ways of establishing legal 
parenthood: automatically or ex lege; as a result of apparent status; by 
acknowledgement or by judicial establishment of paternity. Legal systems differ as to 
which methods they use and how they use them and it is the aim of this paragraph to 
analyse these differences. One important difference between ex lege establishment of 
legal affiliation and the other methods has to be mentioned in advance. In case of ex 
lege establishment of legal affiliation the legal affiliation will (almost) always be in 
conformity with the ground for legal affiliation (the only exception is the ex lege 
establishment of the legal paternity of the mother’s husband). For this reason, legal 
systems provide for systems for annulment of legal affiliation. However, the 
possibility to apply for annulment of legal parenthood is often not unconditional. 
Hence, there are two moments in the law on establishment of legal affiliation at which 
the legislator has to make policy considerations. The first is at the moment at which 
the legislator has to choose between ex lege establishment of legal affiliation, with the 
certainty that legal parenthood will always be in conformity with the ground for legal 
affiliation, and any other method of establishment of legal affiliation which does not 
                                                           
54 If the provisions on the consequences of assisted reproduction apply. 
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offer this guarantee. The second important moment for policy considerations is when 
the legislator has to come up with a system for annulment of legal parenthood. The 
legislator has to determine to what extent it is acceptable to annul an existing legal 
relationship which has such a profound impact on the private life of the individuals 
involved.  
The second aim of this paragraph is therefore to give insight into the reasons 
for deviating from the starting-point for establishing legal affiliation in a national 
legal system. It will turn out that there are not always very clear policy considerations 
for a certain regulation. Tradition and the system of law have played an important role 
in the establishment and annulment of legal parenthood. 
Hereafter, the four methods of establishing legal parenthood will be described. 
It will be explained how they work and how they are applied in the various legal 
systems. After that, a comparative overview of the legal regulations on annulment of 
legal parenthood will be presented. 
1.3.1. Establishment of parenthood – four methods 
1.3.1.1. Ex lege existence of parenthood 
Ex lege existence of parenthood means that legal parenthood exists automatically, 
without any legal action being required to be taken once the requirements are fulfilled 
as laid down in the law. Characteristic for the existence of parenthood ex lege is that 
the existence of parenthood does not depend on action by one of the persons involved. 
An example of ex lege existence of parenthood is the existence of parenthood under 
English law. Under English law, the genetic father is the legal father by dint of being 
the genetic father of the child. It is not necessary to establish his paternity. This is also 
why legal maternity under French law never exists ex lege. After all, under French 
law one must at least mention the mother’s name on the birth certificate before she 
will be considered to be the child’s legal mother, which requires an official action 
(Article 311-25 French Civil Code). Legal maternity does not exist by dint of birth. 
The fact that Article 310-1 French Civil Code states that legal affiliation is established 
by operation of law (par l’effet de la loi) does not alter this proposition.55 
                                                           
55 It must be realised that under French law registration is not considered to be a constitutive element of 
the establishment of legal maternity. In the French perspective legal maternity therefore does not 
follow from the registration of the mother’s name on the birth certificate. It follows from the law, since 
the law provides explicitly that legal maternity follows from registration (Article 311-25 French Civil 
Code). Without that provision, the registration of the mother’s name would – according to French law – 
have no consequence for the legal affiliation of the child. Registration of maternity is therefore from 
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In the case of existence of parenthood ex lege, action is only required in order 
to create proof of the legal situation which has come about automatically; persons 
involved have to register the child as their own. However, in case of ex lege existence 
of parenthood, the legal parenthood does not depend on the registration; it also exists 
without the registration. 
 The consequence of ex lege existence of parenthood is that legal parenthood 
usually corresponds with the national ground of legal affiliation. In the typical case 
the law will state something like: X is the parent of the child (e.g. the woman who 
gives birth to the child is the child’s mother, the man who consents to the artificial 
insemination is the child’s father etc.). The consequence of such a system of ex lege 
attribution of parenthood is that a legal system does not provide for a procedure for 
annulment of parenthood, since there is nothing to annul. This is only different in case 
of marital paternity, i.e. paternity which exists on the basis of marriage of the man 
with the child’s legal mother (see below). 
 In the countries under consideration we find ex lege existence of parenthood at 
various places in the law. First of all, existence of parenthood under English law is, as 
has been stated above, always ex lege, also if it concerns paternity out of wedlock. 
Thus under English law the birthmother is automatically the child’s legal mother and 
the genetic father is automatically the child’s legal father in cases where the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act does not apply. If the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act applies and if the conditions of section 28 of that Act are fulfilled, 
the consenting partner will automatically be the child’s legal father.  
How do we know this? It should be noted that under English law parenthood 
in case of natural reproduction is a matter of common law and as such it has not been 
codified. Thus, there is no statute which says something like ‘the genetic father of the 
child is his or her legal father’. Moreover, the proposition that parenthood exists ex 
                                                                                                                                                                      
the French perspective not the same as acknowledgment of maternity. In case of acknowledgment of 
maternity, the legal maternity follows directly from the acknowledgment.  
From a comparative perspective however registration and acknowledgment under French law 
are the same. It does not matter very much whether one says that legal maternity follows from the law, 
but the law requires registration, or whether one states that the law provides for a possibility of 
acknowledgment of maternity as a result of which legal maternity is established. In both cases, the 
existence of legal maternity depends on legal action being taken. Moreover, there is a fundamental 
difference between the French idea that legal maternity is established by operation of the law if the 
mother’s name is registered as such, and, for example, the Dutch or German idea that even if the 
mother is not registered, she will be the child’s legal mother. This is especially so if one realises that 
under French law, the registration of the mother’s name is at her discretion; it is up to the mother 
whether or not she wants her name to be mentioned on the birth certificate (Article 326 French Civil 
Code). 
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lege is a typical continental way of stating the law. An English lawyer will not use 
this terminology, because the fact that, for example, legal paternity exists ex lege, 
does not have the consequence that the genetic father will have parental 
responsibility. Outside of marriage, the fact that the man is the child’s genetic father 
at least has to be registered before he has parental responsibility.56  
The reason why it is still important to consider the alleged ex lege existence of 
paternity under English law is because continental law makes a clear distinction 
between, on the one hand, establishment of parenthood and, on the other hand, the 
consequences of parenthood. The method of establishing legal parenthood is a big 
issue in continental legal systems, judging from the huge piles of legal writing which 
are dedicated to this issue. The argument for ex lege existence under English law goes 
as follows. Let us take for example section 10 Births and Deaths Registration Act 
1953. It provides: 
 
Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Act [and subject 
to section 10ZA of this Act], in the case of a child whose father and mother 
were not married to each other at the time of his birth, no person shall as father 
of the child be required to give information concerning the birth of the child, 
and the registrar shall not enter in the register the name of any person as father 
of the child except […]. 
 
The provision provides that the unmarried ‘father’ of the child will not be registered, 
unless certain conditions are fulfilled. Obviously one wants to know who is meant 
with the ‘father’. Under legal systems like the French or the German, the word would 
mean legal father and on the basis of the provisions in the Civil Code one would 
investigate who is the child’s legal father. In case of an unmarried father one will find 
that there is no legal father, unless someone acknowledged paternity. It follows that 
continental legal systems put forward a formal concept of legal parenthood: 
parenthood does not depend on a material fact such as genetic affiliation or intention, 
but on a formality such as marriage or a formal procedure such as acknowledgment. 
However, English law does not have such rules.57 Under English law, parenthood is 
                                                           
56 Section 4 Children Act 1989 (inserted by section 11 Adoption and Children Act 2002). 
57 For certain specified areas of law English law provides for a definition of paternity, like for 
nationality law (section 50 (9) British Nationality Act 1981). 
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defined substantially, i.e. with reference to material facts. The first sentences in the 
part on fatherhood from a leading textbook on family law state: 
 
With four exceptions, the law recognises the child’s biological father as his 
legal father. First, if the parents are married any child born to the wife is 
presumed to be the child of the couple. […] 58 
 
The presumption of legitimacy which is mentioned in the citation is only a rule of 
evidence which is used in court proceedings on legal affiliation. And even in such 
proceedings it is a very weak presumption. In Re F (a minor) it was formulated as 
follows: 
  
That means that the presumption of legitimacy now merely determines the 
onus of proof. Once evidence has been led it must be weighed without using 
the presumption as a make-weight in the scale for legitimacy. So even weak 
evidence against legitimacy must prevail if there is no other evidence to 
counterbalance it. The presumption will only come in at that stage in the very 
rare case of the evidence being so evenly balanced that the court is unable to 
reach a decision on it.59 
 
Formally the presumption of legitimacy also exists in case of registration of paternity, 
but it is easily rebutted. The Handbook for Registration Officers instructs registration 
officers as follows: 
 
In space 4 the registrar must enter the name and surname (in block capitals) of 
the father where he is married to the child’s mother at the time of the birth. 
The registrar should ask: ‘What was the full name and surname of the child’s 
father at the date of the birth?’ When the informant is the mother particular 
care should be taken to avoid asking for the information by a question such as 
‘What is your husband’s name?’.60 
 
                                                           
58 .M. Cretney e.a., Principles of Family Law, London: Sweet & Maxwell (2003), p. 524. See also N. 
Lowe & G. Douglas, Bromley’s Family law, Oxford University Press (2007), p. 321. 
59 [1993] 3 WLR 369, (1993) 143 NLJ 472, [1993] Fam. Law 407. 
60 Handbook for Registration Officers, p. B2.20-23c, par. 21, 22 (last update 1/1994/P1). 
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It turns out that if there is a father who has to be registered, it is the genetic father of 
the child. This becomes very clear if we continue reading the instructions for the 
registration officer: 
 
Under the Perjury Act 1911, a person is guilty of an offence if he/she wilfully 
gives a false answer to any question put by a registrar of births and deaths 
relating to the particulars required to be registered, or deliberately gives to the 
registrar false information about a birth or death, or makes a false statement 
with the intent to have it inserted in a register of births or deaths. In these 
circumstances the informant should state the facts which he/she considers to 
be true, and should not state that the mother’s husband is the father of the child 
if it is known that he could not have been (eg by reason of his death or 
continuous absence from her over a long period). The informant would be 
committing an offence if he/she gave information for the registration of the 
birth as that of the child of the mother and her husband knowing that in fact, 
her husband was not the child’s father. But see also para 31a.61 
 
It follows that the presumption of legitimacy has hardly any relevance any more under 
English law. The above also shows that references to father or mother are apparently 
references to the father and mother at common law or under the Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Act. Hence, at common law and under the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act, the father and mother are defined substantially (i.e. with reference 
to material facts on which parenthood is based) and not formally (i.e. with reference 
to a certain procedure which has conferred the status of legal parent on the person 
involved) as is the case under continental law. Consequently, if the method of 
establishing parenthood under English law has to be qualified, it has to be qualified as 
existence of legal parenthood ex lege.  
The consequence of the fact that parenthood exists ex lege under English law 
is that English law does not have a procedure equivalent to the continental procedure 
of acknowledgment. The registration of paternity under English law strongly 
resembles acknowledgment of paternity, but it does not create legal affiliation, as 
continental law acknowledgment does. Moreover, English law also does not have a 
                                                           
61 Handbook for Registration Officers, p. B23-d-31, par. 28 (last update unknown). 
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judicial procedure for establishment or annulment of legal affiliation, since obviously 
there is nothing to establish or to annul. English law only provides for a procedure to 
obtain a declaration of parentage, which is enough.62 Functionally a declaration of 
parentage is the same as a continental judicial procedure for establishment or 
annulment of parenthood but again, the big difference is that under continental law 
those procedures affect the legal reality, while under English law the legal reality 
remains the same, but its appearance changes. It follows that English law on legal 
affiliation is based almost exclusively on evidence. This will be discussed more in 
detail below under ‘evidence’.  
 Parenthood also exists ex lege under continental legal systems. Legal 
maternity under Dutch and German law exists ex lege. Under both legal systems, the 
birthmother is the legal mother of the child solely by dint of the fact that she gave 
birth to the child.63 Under Swedish law it is uncertain whether legal maternity exists 
ex lege or whether it depends on registration. The Children and Parents Code 
(1949:381) does not give an answer and neither does Swedish literature.64 Legal 
maternity under French law does not exist ex lege, but depends on the registration of 
the mother’s name on the child’s birth certificate.65  
Another part in the law on legal affiliation where we find ex lege existence of 
parenthood is the rule that the mother’s husband is the child’s legal father. This rule 
exists under all legal systems under consideration, except under English law.66 The 
reason why the existence of the legal paternity of the mother’s husband is ex lege is 
because his paternity does not arise from any action. It only arises from the existence 
of the legal maternity of the man’s spouse and his marriage to her.  
From a systematic point of view it is important to realise that a legal system 
which provides for parenthood existing ex lege has one major problem and that is 
evidence. Although the parents and the child involved acquire their status 
immediately, they do not immediately have a means to prove their status in society. A 
                                                           
62 Section 55A Family Law Act 1986 (inserted by the Child Support, Pensions and Social Security Act 
2000). 
63 Germany: Article 1591 German Civil Code; the Netherlands: Article 1:198 Dutch Civil Code. 
64 For a discussion of legal maternity in Swedish law see: T. Tolstoy Kongstad, Mater simper certa est? 
En discussion kring moderskappresumtionen i svensk rätt och behovet av lagreglering rörande rättsligt 
moderskap, Examsarbete Juridiska Fakulteten vid Lunds Universitet (2003). 
65 Article 311-25 French Civil Code. 
66 Article 312 French Civil Code; Article 1592 (1) German Civil Code; Article 1:199 Dutch Civil 
Code; Article 1:1 Swedish Children and Parents Code (1949:381). On the presumption of legitimacy 
under English law see supra. 
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registration system generally does not guarantee that the evidence of a legal affiliation 
(the birth certificate) represents the legal reality. This introduces legal uncertainty in 
the registers of civil status, something of which especially continental lawyers are not 
fond. A solution to this problem is to make legal parenthood dependant on an 
administrative action which produces tangible evidence of the legal relationship it 
creates. In that case there will be greater certainty that the birth certificate (or any 
other document meant to prove legal affiliation) correctly represents the legal 
situation. 
1.3.1.2. Establishment of parenthood by means of administrative action 
It is submitted that in every case in which the existence of legal parenthood depends 
on an official action taken by the persons involved and thus does not exist ex lege, it 
has to be established. Establishment of parenthood can be done by an administrative 
authority or by a court (judicial establishment of parenthood). Judicial establishment 
of parenthood will be discussed in the next paragraph.  
From the national legal systems under consideration we can derive three kinds 
of administrative action which establish legal parenthood or which are at least 
mandatory in order to establish legal parenthood: registration of the parents on the 
child’s birth certificate, acknowledgment of parenthood and the procedure to obtain 
an affidavit recording to apparent status of the child.  
Establishment of parenthood through an administrative action has three 
important characteristics. First of all, the existence of legal affiliation depends upon 
the action of the persons involved; no legal relationship exists before the registration 
or the acknowledgment, unlike in case of parenthood which arises ex lege. Secondly, 
and contrary to ex lege existence of legal parenthood, the establishment of legal 
parenthood through an administrative action immediately creates proof of legal 
parenthood. It has already been explained above that a system in which the 
establishment of legal parenthood immediately produces the document which is meant 
to prove the legal parenthood enhances legal certainty. The final characteristic is the 
registrar’s role in case of registration or acknowledgment. Although the precise 
function and powers of the registrar vary from country to country, the main task of a 
registrar is to register the facts declared to him by the persons involved. Unlike a 
judge, a registrar usually has little power to investigate the truth of the declarations of 
the persons before him. Notwithstanding the similarities between administrative 
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actions for establishment of legal parenthood, it is important to keep them apart 
because the rules on annulment of legal parenthood are usually different. 
A separate consequence of a system which obliges persons to establish legal 
affiliation is that such a system allows for more flexibility. By disconnecting the 
grounds for legal affiliation from the process of establishment of affiliation, a legal 
system has the possibility to create rules which allow deviation from the grounds of 
legal affiliation. Under French law for example, legal maternity does not exist ex lege, 
but it depends on the registration of the mother’s name on the child’s birth 
certificate.67 The mother is however not obliged to register her name; she has the right 
to give birth anonymously (accouchement sous X).68 Since the whole idea of 
anonymous birth is that the birthmother does not become the child’s legal mother, it 
makes sense that a legal system does not provide for ex lege existence of legal 
maternity, if it wants to grant women the right of anonymous birth and thus wants to 
allow a certain flexibility as to the ground for legal affiliation (i.e. childbirth). 
In the legal systems under consideration, only French law requires registration 
in order to establish the existence of parenthood. Also the procedure to obtain an 
affidavit which records the apparent status of the child only exists in France,69 and 
therefore it will not be discussed extensively here. 
The third administrative procedure to establish legal parenthood is 
acknowledgment. Acknowledgment of parenthood exists under all legal systems 
under consideration, except under English law.70 The English functional equivalent of 
acknowledgment – registration of the unmarried father – will be discussed under the 
heading of evidence. The common ground in the institutions of Anerkennung, 
reconnaissance, erkenning and bekräftelse is that they are considered a legal act 
within their legal system (Rechtsgeschäft, acte juridique, rechtshandeling,), meaning 
that legal parenthood is established by virtue of an expression of the acknowledger’s 
will, manifest in a legal act. The fact that the validity of the acknowledgment depends 
on the acknowledger’s will does not mean that intention is the ground for legal 
parenthood that follows from the acknowledgment. An acknowledgment raises a 
presumption that the acknowledger is the genetic father or – depending on the legal 
                                                           
67 Article 311-25 French Civil Code.  
68 Article 326 French Civil Code. 
69 Article 317 French Civil Code. 
70 Article 1594 – 1598 German Civil Code; Article 316 French Civil Code; Article 1:204 Dutch Civil 
Code; Article 1:4 Swedish Children and Parents Code (1949:381). 
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system involved – the consenting partner. This is shown by the fact that 
acknowledgment can be annulled if the acknowledger is not the genetic father or the 
consenting partner. The  acknowledger’s will has nothing to do with the substantive 
aspects of the acknowledgment; it is only a formal part of the acknowledgment. The 
importance of the acknowledger’s will is the result of the systems of law in which the 
acknowledgment exists. Dutch, French, German and Swedish civil laws are built 
around the concept that legal consequences follow from a legal act, which, in order to 
be valid, has to be the expression of the will, which at its turn must have been formed 
freely. If the will is defective because of threat, mistake or deceit the legal act is null 
and void and if the legal act is valid it can be annulled in the way prescribed by law.71 
It is submitted that the importance of the acknowledger’s will in civil law systems is a 
result of the legal system where it is used: the continent had a system of civil law 
which was built around the concept of legal act and the system to establish legal 
parenthood had to fit in that system.  
An important consequence of acknowledgment as a system for attribution of 
legal parenthood is that legal parenthood can exist even if it is not in conformity with 
the ground for legal parenthood in the legal system involved, because the validity of 
the acknowledgment does not depend on the substantive truth, but on its formal 
validity. The degree to which this is considered to be a problem varies from country to 
country: in Sweden the discrepancy between the existance or legal parenthood and the 
ground on which it is founded was considered unacceptable and therefore Swedish 
law provides for a system in which an acknowledgment cannot be valid without the 
consent of the Socialnämnd (social welfare commission). The Socialnämnd will only 
consent to the acknowledgment if it is convinced that the acknowledger is the child’s 
genetic father (or if he consented to the fertility treatment).72 At the other side of the 
spectrum is French law which does not have any problems with substantive truth. 
Also under French law, acknowledgment of paternity raises the presumption that the 
man is the child’s genetic father, but no one will check the truth. After a certain period 
of time it even becomes impossible to apply for annulment of acknowledgment.  
1.3.1.3. Judicial establishment of parenthood 
                                                           
71 Some legal systems provide that annulment of acknowledgment because of a defective will is not 
possibile. However, that is then an exception to the general rule that legal acts can be annulled because 
of a defective will. 
72 Article 1:4 Swedish Children and Parents Code (1949:381). 
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Judicial establishment of parenthood is a judicial procedure by which the court 
establishes legal parenthood upon proof of the existence of a ground for legal 
affiliation (genetic affiliation, intention or apparent status).73 Judicial establishment of 
parenthood is only possible if the child does not yet have a parent from both sexes (or 
under Swedish law, if the lesbian partner did not acknowledge maternity). Therefore 
judicial establishment of legal maternity is not possible in countries in which legal 
maternity exists ex lege. Since judicial establishment of parenthood creates a legal 
relationship, a declaration of parentage under English law is not judicial establishment 
of parenthood although it is its functional equivalent. Declarations of parentage will 
be explained under the heading of evidence. 
The characteristics of judicial establishment of parenthood are the inverse of 
establishment of parenthood by an administrative action. So, it is pretty sure that 
parenthood will only be attributed in conformity with the ground for legal parenthood. 
Moreover, the national authority involved has extensive competence to investigate 
whether the applicant or the respondent is the child’s father or mother.  
Legal systems on judicial establishment of parenthood differ in various 
respects. The most important difference concerns the rules on the use of DNA 
evidence. This will be discussed below under evidence. Other differences concern the 
exceptions to the ground of legal affiliation, the locus standi and the statutory periods 
of limitation. 
a. Exceptions to the grounds of legal affiliation 
The general rule under the legal systems under consideration is that the court will 
establish legal parenthood if the existence of a ground for legal affiliation is proven. 
Hence, the establishment of the spermdonor as a parent is prohibited under all legal 
systems except under German law.74 There are a couple of exceptions to this rule. 
First of all, regarding Dutch law it has been stated that only genetic affiliation is a 
ground for legal affiliation. However, according to Article 1:207 Dutch Civil Code, 
the man, who consented to the act which could have resulted in the procreation of the 
child can also be established to be the child’s father, if he was the mother’s partner. 
                                                           
73 Article 1600d German Civil Code; Article 325 – 331 French Civil Code; 1:207 Dutch Civil Code; 
1:5 Swedish Children and Parents Code (1949:381). 
74 English law: Section 28 (6) Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act; French law: Article 311-19 
French Civil Code; Swedish law: Article 1:5 Swedish Children and Parents Code (1949:381). Dutch 
law see note 75 below. German law: BT Drucks. 12/2091, in which the government answers the 
question to what extent the anonymity of the sperm donor is protected. See also Münchener 
Kommentar zum BGB Volume 8/Seidel (2002), p. 69. 
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This provision should be considered together with the provision that under Dutch law 
only the child and the mother can apply for judicial establishment of paternity. The 
reason for this rule is primarily to protect the mother’s interest: it was deemed 
unacceptable that if the mother and her partner decided to obtain fertility treatment 
with donor semen, the partner could escape his responsibilities by not acknowledging 
paternity. Also the child’s interest in having a legal father played an important role. 
The establishment of the legal paternity of the anonymous sperm donor is for the 
same reason prohibited under Dutch law.75 While, on the one hand, the interests of the 
mother and child are honoured by giving them a possibility to apply for judicial 
establishment of paternity, the consenting partner’s interest (i.e. his intention to 
become the legal parent) is, on the other hand, not protected, which indicates that 
intention is still not a ground for legal affiliation under Dutch law. After all, in case of 
marital paternity the legal presumption of paternity in favour of the mother’s husband 
is susceptible to annulment on application by the child76 and in case of assisted 
reproduction out of wedlock the consenting partner can only establish that he is the 
child’s father with the mother’s consent.77 
The second exception to the rule that legal parenthood will be judicially 
established if the existence of a ground for legal affiliation is proved is that under 
Dutch and French law, the establishment of legal affiliation with both parents is not 
possible in case of an incestuous relationship between the father and the child’s 
                                                           
75 Under Dutch law one can only judicially establish the legal paternity of the consenting partner or the 
begetter. The anonymous sperm donor is neither of these two persons. See also J. de Boer, Asser’s 
Personen en Familierecht, Deventer: Kluwer (2002), p. 499.  
76 Article 1:200 (1) Dutch Civil Code. 
77 Under Dutch law, legal paternity of the consenting partner can be established by means of 
acknowledgment of paternity and by means of judicial establishment. The consenting partner has no 
standing to apply for judicial establishment of his legal paternity (Art. 1:207 Dutch Civil Code) and 
acknowledgment of paternity requires the mother’s consent (and the child when the child has reached 
the age of twelve) (art. 1:204 (1) under c and d Dutch Civil Code). If the man is the begetter of the 
child, he can apply for substitution of the mother’s consent on the basis of Article 1:204 (3) Dutch Civil 
Code, if she refuses to consent to his acknowledgment. However, the consenting partner is usually not 
the begetter of the child, since the begetter is the man who begot the child via sexual intercourse. 
Consequently, the consenting partner has no direct right of action under the Civil Code to apply for 
substitution of the mother’s consent. So far the Dutch Supreme Court has not been asked to rule upon 
the legality of this situation. In a case where a sperm donor (also not a begetter) applied for substitution 
of the mother’s consent, the Dutch Supreme Court held that the mother’s consent could only be 
replaced by judicial consent if the donor could show that the mother’s refusal amounted to an abuse of 
her right to give consent (HR 24th January 2003, NJ 2003/386). An important difference between the 
sperm donor and the consenting partner is that the former, but not the latter, is the child’s genetic 
father.  
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mother.78 Under those legal systems it is deemed not to be in the child’s interest to 
have the incestuous relationship recognised in law.79 
b. Locus standi 
The right to apply for judicial establishment of parenthood is restricted under all legal 
systems under consideration. The reason to restrict the locus standi of this action is its 
personal nature. Within the legal systems involved, there are two groups of persons 
who have standing: the persons directly involved (the child, the mother and the father) 
and their heirs. 
With regard to the locus standi of the persons who are directly involved in the 
action, most legal systems provide an unrestricted right for the child and a restricted 
or dependant right for the mother. Only under German law do the child, the mother 
and the alleged father have the right to apply for judicial establishment of paternity on 
an equal footing.80 Under Dutch law the child has an unrestricted right to apply for 
judicial establishment of paternity, but during the child’s minority he or she is 
represented by a special representative (bijzondere curator).81 The mother’s right to 
apply for judicial establishment is restricted by a statutory period of limitation: she 
has to apply within five years from the child’s birth or within five years from the 
moment at which she knows who the begetter of the child is.82 Under French law, 
only the child has the right to apply for judicial establishment of maternity or 
paternity.83 However, during the child’s minority only a person established to be a 
legal parent of the child has the right to apply on the child behalf.84 Swedish law 
provides more or less the same. The child has the right to apply for judicial 
establishment of paternity, but during the child’s minority the Socialnämnd or the 
mother have the right to exercise the right.85 Since it will be argued below that the 
English declaration of parentage is the functional equivalent of judicial establishment 
                                                           
78 Article 1:207 (2) under b Dutch Civil Code; Article 310-2 French Civil Code. 
79 France: F. Dekeuwer-Defossez e.a. Rénover le droit de la famille: propostions pour un droit adapté 
aux réalités et aux aspirations de notre temps, Paris: La documentation Française (1999), p. 45. The 
Netherlands: Second Chamber, 1995-1996, 24 649, nr. 3, p. 19 (explanatory notes). 
80 Article 1600e German Civil Code. See also Staudinger’s Kommentar zum BGB, Part IV/Rauscher, 
Berlin: Sellier – de Gruyter (2004), p. 525. 
81 Article 1:212 Dutch Civil Code. 
82 Article 1:207 (3) Dutch Civil Code. 
83 Articles 325 and 327 French Civil Code. 
84 Article 328 French Civil Code. 
85 Article 3:5 Swedish Children and Parents Code (1949:381). 
 34
of parenthood, it is worth mentioning that under English law everyone with sufficient 
personal interest can apply for a declaration of parentage.86 
The second group which has locus standi to apply for judicial establishment of 
parenthood are the heirs of the persons who are directly involved and who have a 
right to apply. Under German and Swedish law the heirs or the descendants do not 
have a statutory right to apply for judicial establishment of paternity after the child’s 
death. Under Dutch law however, the descendants in the first degree(afstammelingen) 
of the child (X) are allowed to apply for judicial establishment of the fact that a man 
(Y) is the father of their deceased parent (X). However, their right is restricted: they 
only have that right if the alleged father (Y) is still alive and on condition that the 
right is exercised within one year after learning of the death of their parent (X).87 The 
mother’s descendants have no such right. Under French law, more or less the same 
rule applies. Not, as in Dutch law, the descendants, but the broader group of heirs 
have the right to exercise the right to apply for judicial establishment of paternity if 
the deceased died before expiry of the statutory period of limitation.88 For judicial 
establishment of parenthood this means that the X’s heirs can apply for judicial 
establishment of Y as X’s father, if X died before the ending of the statutory period of 
limitation, which is ten years after X has come of age in case of judicial establishment 
of parenthood.89  
c. Statutory periods of limitation 
In certainly not for the child. This is only different under French law where the child 
has to apply within ten years after he or she has come of age.90 Moreover, under 
Dutch and Swedish law the mother’s right (and the Socialnämnd) is restricted in time. 
Under Dutch law, the mother has to apply within five years after she becomes aware 
of the identity of the begetter91 and under Swedish law the Socialnämnd and the 
mother can only apply during the child’s minority.92 Under German law, the right to 
apply for judicial establishment of paternity is not restricted in time for any of the 
                                                           
86 Section 55a (3) Family Law Act 1986. 
87 Article 1:207 (4) Dutch Civil Code. 
88 Article 322 French Civil Code. 
89 Article 321 French Civil Code. 
90 See note 89. 
91 See note 82. 
92 See note 85. 
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applicants. Even after the child has come of age, the alleged father and the mother 
have a statutory right to apply for judicial establishment of paternity.93  
1.3.1.4. Annulment of parenthoodgeneral the right to apply for judicial establishment of 
parenthood is not restricted in time,  
Annulment of legal parenthood is a mechanism which provides for the possibility to 
bring legal parenthood in conformity with the grounds for legal affiliation.94 
Therefore, procedures for annulment of legal parenthood only exist in legal systems 
which have a system of attribution of parenthood which does not guarantee that legal 
parenthood is in conformity with the grounds for legal affiliation. Annulment of 
parenthood which exists ex lege is usually not possible. The only exception to this 
rule within the systems under consideration is the procedure for annulment of 
paternity arising form the presumption of paternity by dint of marriage with the 
child’s mother.  
Procedures for annulment of legal parenthood are always restricted and there 
are a lot of possible restrictions: locus standi, statutory periods of limitation and 
additional requirements such as lack of capacity at the moment of acknowledgment or 
the absence of apparent status. Also the rules on evidence restrict the possibility of 
annulling legal parenthood under certain legal system. Reasons which have been 
advanced for these restrictions are the protection of the legal family or the private life 
of the persons directly involved (restrictions on locus standi), stability of the legal 
affiliation status of the child (statutory periods of limitation, existence of a lack of 
capacity at the moment of acknowledgment), preservation of de facto family, of social 
reality (requirement of the absence of apparent status). These reasons will be 
discussed in more detail below. Here, it should be noted, in the light of the discussion 
on Article 8 ECHR below, that these reasons or interests can be formulated as public 
and private interests. For example, the reason for statutory periods of limitation 
usually is to protect the stability of the legal affiliation status. Stability of affiliation 
status is in the state’s interest, in particular in the maintainance of a reliable state 
administration, but it is also in the child’s interest because the development of a close 
personal relationship is supported by the measure. It will be explained below that 
when in a concrete case certain restrictions do not protect any private interest any 
                                                           
93 Staudinger’s Kommentar zum BGB, Part IV/Rauscher, Berlin: Sellier – de Gruyter (2004), p. 530. 
94 This paragraph does not deal with the possibility which exists in France to declare an 
acknowledgment null and void because of a defective will.  
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more – for example, all the parties directly involved agree that notwithstanding the 
expiration of the statutory period of limitation the legal paternity should be annulled – 
it is more likely that the restriction will violate Article 8 ECHR.  
 Before we embark on a detailed analysis on the regulations on annulment of 
legal parenthood, two preliminary remarks on the structure of these regulations have 
to be made. First, in most cases annulment of legal parenthood can only be done by a 
court; one needs to follow a judicial procedure. However, under certain circumstances 
some legal systems allow for administrative annulment of parenthood. Second, some 
legal systems have a regulation for annulment of parenthood which applies to all 
forms of establishment of legal parenthood but there are also legal systems which 
have separate provisions for the annulment of legal parenthood according to the form 
of establishment. In the following analysis judicial procedures for annulment of 
parenthood will first be discussed, followed by the administrative procedures. The 
legal systems under consideration do not provide for a possibility to annul legal 
parenthood which is based on judicial establishment. The possibility to set aside 
judicially established legal parenthood in a revision procedure falls outside the scope 
of this article.  
a. Judicial annulment of legal parenthood 
Judicial annulment of maternity is only possible in France. Under Dutch, English and 
German law legal maternity exists ex lege and therefore annulment of legal maternity 
is not possible. Of course it is possible under these legal systems that another woman 
than the birthmother is registered on the birth certificate and obviously there are 
procedures to change the birth certificate in such a case. However, those procedures 
are not procedures for annulment of legal maternity. They only concern the 
registration of legal maternity and therefore they will be discussed under the heading 
of evidence. The procedure for annulment of legal maternity in France is the same as 
for legal paternity, so no separate reference will be made as to whether the procedure 
concerns the mother or the father.  
The ground for annulment of legal parenthood in all legal systems is that legal 
affiliation does not correspond with the ground for legal affiliation which applies in 
the situation at hand.95 So, the ground for annulment of legal paternity in Germany 
and the Netherlands is that the legal father is not the genetic father of the child. In 
                                                           
95 See § 1.2. Grounds for legal affiliation. See note 21 for an overview of the national provisions on 
annulment of legal parenthood. 
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Sweden the grounds are that the man is not the genetic father or that the parent did not 
(validly) consent to the fertility treatment. In France, one adds the absence of apparent 
status.96 This paragraph will mainly focus on the different restrictions which are 
imposed on the possibility to apply for judicial annulment of parenthood. They are 
discussed under the headings of apparent status, locus standi and statutory periods of 
limitation. However, we will start with a separate discussion of the list of additional 
restrictions on the possibility to apply for annulment of legal paternity which only 
exist under Dutch law. 
b. Restrictions on judicial annulment of paternity under Dutch law 
Apart from the restrictions on annulment of legal paternity which will be discussed 
under the following headings, Dutch law contains a set of restrictions which are not 
found in the other legal systems. It concerns restrictions on the possibility to annul 
marital paternity and paternity established by means of acknowledgment of paternity. 
The legal parents cannot annul marital paternity under Dutch law if the man 
knew before the marriage that the woman was pregnant97 or if the man consented to 
the act which could have resulted in the procreation of the child.98 These exceptions 
do not apply if the woman has deceived the man as to who has conceived the child.99 
The raison d’être of the consent-exception has already been discussed above.100 The 
reason behind the first exception is that according to Dutch law, marriage with a 
pregnant woman is considered a tacit acknowledgment of paternity.101 This somewhat 
archaic justification also explains the exception to the exception: if the woman 
deceived her husband as to the paternity of the child he would probably not have 
married her in the first place (continuing the archaic line of reasoning), so he should at 
least be allowed to annul his paternity. Although the justification does not sound ultra 
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modern, one has to point to the similarity with acknowledgment of paternity, which is 
also very hard to annul.102  
The deceit-exception also applies to the consent-exception. Therefore, if the 
married couple agrees that the woman will have sexual intercourse with X in order to 
get a child, but secretly the woman has intercourse with Y, the husband is allowed to 
apply for annulment of his paternity.103 
Also with regard to annulment of acknowledgment of paternity Dutch law 
provides for additional requirements. First of all, Article 1:205 (1) Dutch Civil Code 
provides that the child can only apply for annulment of legal parenthood on the basis 
of acknowledgment if the acknowledgment took place during his or her minority. If 
the acknowledgment took place during the child’s minority, the child can apply 
without further restrictions for annulment of legal parenthood within the prescribed 
period of limitation (see next paragraph). If the acknowledgment took place after the 
child has come of age, the child has no right to apply for annulment of legal paternity 
at all. The legal parents can only apply for annulment of legal parenthood based on 
acknowledgment if the acknowledgment or the consent to the acknowledgment has 
come about under the influence of threats, mistake, deceit or, if the acknowledgment 
was done during the minority of the acknowledger or the mother, undue influence 
(bedreiging, dwaling, bedrog of misbruik van omstandigheden). The reason is that the 
establishment of legal affiliation was not considered something which the persons 
involved should be able to dispose of as they pleased.104 
c. Judicial annulment of legal parenthood and apparent status 
The meaning of apparent status has already been explained briefly above.105 It has 
also been explained that the function of apparent status is diverse. Under French law, 
it is, for example, a ground for legal affiliation, but the concept is also used for other 
purposes under French and Dutch law. Under both legal systems the existence of 
apparent status in conformity with the title of legal affiliation (i.e. the birth certificate 
or the instrument of acknowledgment of parenthood) limits the possibility of 
annulling legal affiliation. Thus under Dutch law legal affiliation can only be annulled 
if the child has apparent status with regard to the parent who is mentioned on the birth 
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certificate.106 This provision has potentially far-reaching consequences, although it is 
hardly used in practice. Article 1:209 Dutch Civil Code means for example that if a 
child develops apparent status with regard to the husband before the expiry of the 
statutory period of limitation in Article 1:200 Dutch Civil Code, the husband will not 
be able to apply for annulment of the paternity established by the presumption based 
on marriage to the child’s mother. Even if the wrong mother is registered on the birth 
certificate and if the child develops apparent status with regard to her, it is not 
possible to correct the birth certificate! The reason for this provision is that 
established social relations should not be disrupted.107  
Under French law the coexistence of apparent status with the title of legal 
affiliation has as a consequence that the statutory period to annul the legal affiliation 
which exists on the basis of the title shortens and that the locus standi is more limited. 
Thus, Article 333 French Civil Code provides that if the apparent status is in 
conformity with the title of legal affiliation, only the child, the legal parents and the 
alleged parents are allowed to apply for annulment of legal parenthood which is based 
on that title (i.e. a registration or an acknowledgment). Moreover, they have to act 
within 5 years after the apparent status has ceased to exist and before the apparent 
status and the title have coexisted for 5 years. If the title is not supported by apparent 
status, everyone with an interest is allowed to apply for annulment of legal parenthood 
within ten years after the title has been drawn up.108  
d. Locus standi 
Another important restriction on the possibility to annul legal parenthood is the 
presence or absence of locus standi. The main reason in all legal systems to provide 
for a restriction on the locus standi for annulment of legal parenthood is the protection 
of the legal family and the private life of the members of that family.109 This common 
idea does not prevent the legal systems involved from coming up with different 
regulations. Especially the right of the biological parent who is not the child’s legal 
parent to apply for annulment of legal parenthood differs considerably. A second 
issue regarding locus standi is the right of the heirs to apply for annulment on behalf 
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or in the place of a deceased relative and the right of the public prosecutor to 
intervene on behalf of the public interest. 
 Under German law, the child and the legal parents have the right to apply for 
annulment of legal paternity.110 As will be explained below, the applicants’ rights are 
not unrestricted: they are limited in time and the legal parents are not allowed to apply 
for annulment of legal paternity if they have consented to the assisted reproduction 
treatment.111 The latter reason has been inserted by the 
Kinderrechtverbesserungsgesetz 2002. Notwithstanding German reluctance to allow 
assisted reproduction, the legislator wanted to provide for a minimum regulation to 
protect the child who has been conceived following fertility treatment with donor 
semen.112 Besides the members of the nuclear family also the alleged genetic father 
has a limited right to apply for annulment of legal paternity, following a decision of 
the German Constitutional Court in 2003.113 The right of the alleged genetic father is 
restricted though, in order to protect legal certainty and the legal family.114 Article 
1600 (2) German Civil Code provides that the alleged genetic father is only allowed 
to apply for annulment of legal paternity if there is no social family relationship 
(sozial-familiäre Beziehung) between the legal father and the child. Such a 
relationship is presumed to exist if the legal father has brought the child up and if the 
legal father lived or lives together with the legal mother and child.115 
French law has a separate regulation for annulment of legal affiliation which 
exists ex lege (i.e. marital paternity), either, on the one hand, on the basis of 
registration or acknowledgment, or, on the other hand, legal affiliation which exists 
on the basis of apparent status recorded in an affidavit. Locus standi for annulment of 
legal parenthood which exists ex lege or on the basis of registration or 
acknowledgment is more or less the same as under German law, but in French law 
there seem to be fewer problems in accepting the right of the alleged parent (father or 
mother) to apply for annulment of parenthood. Under French law the locus standi 
depends on whether the title for legal affiliation (i.e. the birth certificate or the 
instrument of acknowledgment) is supported by apparent status or not. If the title is 
supported by apparent status, which is usually the case, only the child, the legal 
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parents and the alleged parents have the right to apply for annulment of parenthood.116 
If the legal affiliation which is based on registration or acknowledgment is not 
supported by apparent status, the legal affiliation can be annulled by everyone with 
sufficient interest.117 Locus standi to annul legal affiliation which exists on the basis 
of apparent status recorded in an affidavit can be annulled by everyone with sufficient 
interest.118 
Under Dutch and Swedish law the alleged parent is not allowed to apply for 
annulment of legal parenthood, although under Dutch law there is a possibility to 
circumvent this rule under certain circumstances. Under Dutch law, only the legal 
parents and the child have a statutory right to apply for annulment of marital 
paternity119 or paternity which exists on the basis of acknowledgment.120 Nonetheless, 
the biological father has a possibility to set aside the acknowledgment by another man 
under certain circumstances. In that respect one has to distinguish the case in which 
the biological father is the begetter of the child from the case in which he is the sperm 
donor. If the begetter wants to acknowledge paternity and if the mother refuses to 
consent, he can apply for judicial consent which will replace the consent of the 
mother.121 He will obtain judicial consent, unless it is shown that the establishment of 
his paternity is detrimental to the child’s interests. Emotional resistance on the 
mother’s part is not enough to refuse the begetter judicial consent.122 It is however 
possible that the mother consented to the acknowledgment of the child by another 
man. In that case the Dutch Supreme Court decided that the begetter’s possibility to 
set aside the acknowledgment depends on whether the mother allowed the begetter the 
possibility to apply for judicial consent.123 If that is the case, i.e. if the begetter had 
enough time to apply for judicial consent following the refusal of the mother to 
consent, the court will only set aside the acknowledgment of the other man if the 
begetter shows that the mother’s consent was given with no other reason than to harm 
his interests. If the mother did not allow the begetter enough time, the court will set 
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aside the acknowledgment if the begetter shows that the mother could not have 
reasonably consented to the acknowledgment, taken into account the begetter’s 
interests. There is no case law on the question whether the biological father has a 
possibility to set aside an acknowledgment, in the situation that the genetic father is 
not the child’s begetter but the sperm donor.124 
Under Swedish law only the child and the legal father have the right to apply 
for annulment of marital paternity.125 Swedish law does not have statutory provisions 
on locus standi for annulment of acknowledgment, but is generally accepted that only 
the legal father and the child have the right to apply for annulment of 
acknowledgment.126 
 Besides the persons who are directly involved in the issue of legal affiliation, 
the heirs and the public prosecutor also have standing to apply for annulment of legal 
parenthood under certain circumstances. The applicant’s heirs have standing to apply 
for annulment of legal parenthood, if the applicant died before the expiration of the 
period of limitation which applied to the applicant. They also have to bring their 
action within the period which applied to the decedent.127 Under Dutch law Article 
1:201 Dutch Civil Code provides for a regulation which applies equally to annulment 
of marital paternity (based on the presumption arising from marriage to the child’s 
mother) and paternity based on acknowledgment. The descendants, and if there are 
none, the spouse, and if there is no spouse, the parents of the legal parent, have the 
right to apply for annulment of parenthood if the legal parent died before the 
expiration of the period of limitation which applies to the deceased legal parent. They 
have to apply within one year after they are informed of the death of the legal parent. 
In case of the child, only the descendants of the child have the right to apply for 
annulment of legal paternity if the child died before the expiration of the period of 
limitation which applies to the child. If the child died after he or she has come of age, 
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the descendants have to apply within one year after they were informed of the child’s 
death. If the child died during his minority, the descendants have to apply within one 
year after the moment the child would have come of age. 
 Finally, under French law the public prosecutor has the right to apply for 
annulment of legal parenthood if it appears from the register itself that the legal 
affiliation is not in conformity with the grounds for legal affiliation or in case of fraus 
legis.128 In Dutch law, the power of the public prosecutor is limited to legal affiliation 
on the basis of acknowledgment, if the acknowledger is not the child’s begetter and if 
his acknowledgment violates Dutch public policy.129 A proposal is pending to 
introduce a similar possibility under German law.130  
e. Statutory periods of limitation 
As with the regulation on locus standi, the reasons why legal systems provide for 
statutory periods of limitation are usually the same, but that does not prevent 
considerable difference in outcome: we will see periods of limitation ranging from 
one to ten years. The main reason to provide for a time limit on the action for 
annulment of legal parenthood is to grant stability to the legal affiliation status of the 
child. Also the protection of family peace has been mentioned in this respect.131 Only 
Sweden has taken the step of abolishing the periods of limitation, since the protection 
of legitimacy was not necessary any more and it was deemed in the interest of both 
the father and the child to able to clarify the genetic affiliation at any time.132  
Legal systems which provide for a period of limitation for annulment of legal 
parenthood differ as to the length of the period, but also as to the moment at which the 
period starts running. Under German law, the period of limitation is two years for all 
applicants.133 The period starts running at the moment the applicant is informed that 
the legal father is probably not the child’s genetic father. For the alleged genetic 
father who is not the legal father this means that the period starts running against him 
as soon as he is informed that the legal father is not the child’s genetic father. 
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Whether he is also informed that he is probably the genetic father is irrelevant.134 
Moreover, the period for the alleged father runs, even if there is a social family 
relationship within the meaning of Article 1600 (2) German Civil Code during which 
he is precluded from applying for annulment on the basis of that same article. The 
provisions are less severe for the child. If the legal paternity has not been annulled 
during the child’s minority, he or she can apply for annulment within two years after 
he or she has come of age or at a later moment if the child is informed later that the 
legal father is probably not the genetic father. Moreover, Article 1600 (5) German 
Civil Code provides for a possibility to renew the period of limitation of the child if at 
any time the child is informed of facts which make the existence of legal paternity 
intolerable for the child, for example when the legal parents get divorced or when the 
legal mother marries the child’s genetic father.135  
Under Dutch law the period of limitation for annulment of legal paternity is 
one year for the legal parents and three years for the child. For annulment of marital 
paternity the period starts running for the mother at the moment of birth.136 For the 
legal father and the child the period starts running at the moment they are informed 
that the legal father is probably not the child’s genetic father.137 If the child is 
informed during his minority, the period starts at the moment he or she comes of 
age.138 The regulation is the same for annulment of legal paternity based on 
acknowledgment.139 regarding the moment at which the period starts to run against 
the legal parents, Article 1:205 (3) Dutch Civil Code provides, regarding the moment 
at which the period starts to run against the legal parents, that the period starts running 
at the moment at which the threats, mistake or deceit are discovered or when the 
undue influence has stopped.140 
Finally, under French law the length of the statutory period depends on 
whether or not the child has a title (e.g. a birth certificate) which is confirmed by 
apparent status (possession d’état). If the title is not confirmed by apparent status the 
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period starts running from the moment at which the child acquired the disputed status 
and the action has to be brought within ten years.141 If the title is confirmed by 
apparent status, there are two periods of limitation:142 the first period starts running at 
the moment the title is confirmed by apparent status and after five years the status 
becomes inviolable. However, if the apparent status ceases to exist before the end of 
the fifth year the action for annulment of marital paternity has to be brought within 
five years from the moment at which the apparent status has ceased to exist. In case of 
annulment of legal affiliation which exists on the basis of apparent status recorded in 
an affidavit, the period of limitation is five years from the moment at which the 
affidavit was drawn up.143 
f. Administrative annulment of parenthood 
Under Dutch, German and Swedish law it is possible to annul legal paternity which 
arises on the basis of marriage with the child’s mother (the presumption of paternity) 
by an administrative procedure. The ground for annulment in such case is that it is 
unlikely that the husband is the child’s genetic father, although the absence of genetic 
affiliation does not need to be proven.  
Administrative annulment under Swedish and German law is only possible if 
at the same time another man acknowledges paternity. Swedish law offers the 
broadest possibility in that it is provided that marital paternity can always be annulled 
if someone else validly acknowledges parenthood.144 Valid acknowledgment in this 
context means that the mother and the Socialnämnd have consented to the 
acknowledgment and, in case of annulment of marital paternity, also the legal father 
himself.145 The consent of the Socialnämnd purports to guarantee that legal paternity 
will be in conformity with the genetic affiliation, since the Socialnämnd will only 
consent if it is convinced that the acknowledger is the child’s parent according to the 
Swedish grounds for legal parenthood.146 
Under Dutch and German law the possibilities of annulling marital paternity 
are much more limited than is the case under Swedish law. A possible explanation for 
the limitation is that, unlike under Swedish law, Dutch and German law do not have 
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an institution similar to the Swedish Socialnämnd, which investigates whether the 
husband is indeed not the child’s genetic father. Consequently, the possibility for 
administrative annulment is limited to only those situations where it is highly unlikely 
that the husband is the child’s genetic father.147 Accordingly, under Dutch law, the 
administrative annulment of marital paternity is only possible if the mother’s husband 
died within 306 days before the birth of the child and if the husband and the wife 
lived separately from the 306th day before the birth of the child or if they were legally 
separated, but not divorced (gescheiden van tafel en bed). 148 If the mother was 
married at the moment of the child’s birth, her new husband will be the child’s legal 
father by dint of the presumption of paternity.149 The Dutch provision should be seen 
in the light of the rule that normally, if the husband died within 306 days before the 
birth of the child, he will be considered to be the child’s father, even if the mother was 
remarried at the moment of birth. If the marriage has been dissolved by other causes 
than death, the ex-husband will not be considered to be the child’s legal father.150 
According to German law, the administrative annulment of marital paternity 
has been introduced in order to avoid expensive judicial procedures in cases where 
everyone agrees and where it is already at the outset unlikely that the husband is the 
child’s genetic father.151 The administrative annulment is only possible if the child 
was born after the spouses have filed for divorce, but are not yet divorced. In such a 
case, another man can become the child’s legal father by acknowledging paternity 
within one year after the divorce has become final and if the mother and her (ex)-
husband consent to the acknowledgment.  
1.4. Evidence and legal parenthood 
The final step in the comparison of the laws on legal affiliation concerns evidence. 
Evidence is relevant to legal affiliation in two respects. First, a regulation which 
requires the production of produce tangible evidence of legal reality is the third step 
which our hypothetical legislator has to take. This step is less interesting in legal 
systems which use a method of attributing legal parenthood by means of 
administrative of judicial establishment, because the creation of evidence and the 
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establishment of legal parenthood are basically the same thing. However, it becomes 
more important in a system which allows legal affiliation to arise in e given situation 
ex lege, such as is the case with legal parenthood under English law and legal 
maternity under Dutch and German law. In that case, it is interesting to see how the 
legislator tries to ensure that the evidence actually represents legal reality and to what 
extent the legislator creates the possibility of correcting that evidence if the legal 
parenthood thus established does not represent legal reality.  
Secondly, evidence is an important issue in court proceedings on legal 
affiliation. It has been explained above that, in court proceedings concerning 
establishment or annulment of legal affiliation, it is necessary to prove the existence 
or absence of a ground for legal affiliation. Especially if genetic affiliation does has to 
be proven, the question of evidence becomes interesting because the legal systems 
under consideration give different answers to the question whether a DNA test is to be 
granted (depending on the circumstances) and to the question what should happen if 
one or more of the parties do not cooperate with a DNA test. 
1.4.1. Evidence and ex lege existence of parenthood 
When legal parenthood exists ex lege, the issue of registration is important. It has to 
be examined whether the registration provides for control mechanisms which enhance 
the chance that the registration is in conformity with legal reality. Under Dutch law, 
the registration of legal maternity is regulated in the Dutch Civil Code and in the Civil 
Status Degree 1994 (Besluit Burgerlijke Stand 1994).152 Registration of the child’s 
legal mother is mandatory.153 According to Article 19e (9) Dutch Civil Code, the civil 
status registrar is authorised to require a written declaration given by a doctor or 
midwife that the woman mentioned as the child’s mother indeed gave birth to that 
child.154 The registrar is, however, not obliged to ask for such evidence. It happens as 
a result of fraud or mistake that the birth certificate does not mention the legal mother, 
but another woman as the child’s mother. In that case the birth certificate can be 
amended on the basis of Article 24 Dutch Civil Code, upon request by an interested 
party or the public prosecutor. There are neither statutory periods of limitation nor any 
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special requirements with regard to evidence.155 However, if the child has apparent 
status in conformity with the affiliation status as recorded in the register, only the 
child is allowed to apply for an amendment of his or her birth certificate.156 
Under German law, the registration of civil status is regulated by the Civil 
Status Act 1937 (Personenstandsgesetz 1937). The procedure for registration of legal 
maternity under German law is more or less the same as under Dutch law. However, 
German law does not confer upon the registrar the possibility of requiring a written 
declaration by a doctor or midwife. In fact, there are no rules regulating how legal 
maternity should be proven.157 If the wrong woman has been registered, for whatever 
reason, the registration can be changed following proof of the error in court.158 The 
legal basis for such a procedure is either Article 47 Civil Status Act 1937 or Article 
640 (2) German Code on Civil Procedure.  
Under English law the registration of legal parenthood is regulated by the 
Births and Deaths Registration Act 1953 and the Registration of Births and Deaths 
Regulations 1987 (SI 1987/2088). As in the Netherlands and Germany, under English 
law, the registration of the mother’s name and the legal father’s name if he is married 
to the mother is mandatory159 and as under German law there is no prescribed form 
for proving legal maternity. Under English law the registration of the unmarried father 
(i.e. the father who is not married to the mother of the child) is not mandatory and is 
regulated by Sections 10 and 10A Births and Deaths Registration Act.160 These 
articles in essence provide that if the child’s parents apply to the civil status registrar’s 
office together, or if either the mother or the father is able to produce written evidence 
of the consent of the other, the father will be registered as father on the birth 
certificate.161 If the registration is disputed, either by one of the persons who has been 
registered as the child’s parent or by someone else who claims to be the legal father, 
the person can apply for a declaration of parentage under Section 55A Family Law 
Act 1986. However, and otherwise than is the case a procedure for judicial 
establishment of parenthood in the above-mentioned continental systems, the court is 
                                                           
155 The general rules on evidence apply, Articles 149-207 Dutch Code on Civil Procedure. 
156 Article 1:209 Dutch Civil Code. 
157 Staudinger’s Kommentar zum BGB, Part IV/Rauscher, Berlin: Sellier – de Gruyter (2004), p. 188. 
158 Article 60 (2) Civil Status Act 1937. 
159 Section 7 Registration of Births and Deaths Regulations 1987. 
160 The meaning of ‘father’ has been explained above § 1.3.1.1. Ex lege existence of parenthood. 
161 Section 10 Births and Deaths Registration Act applies to the registration of the unmarried father at 
the moment of the registration of the birth. Section 10A applies to the registration of the father after the 
birth has been registered.  
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allowed to refuse to hear an application under Section 55A Family Law Act, if the 
court considers that such application is not in the child’s interests.162 If the court finds 
that the registration is incorrect, the birth certificate will be changed accordingly.163 
The possibility of obtaining a declaration of parentage was introduced by the Child 
Support, Pensions and Social Security Act 2000 in order to satisfy the need to provide 
for a determination of legal affiliation which binds everyone. Findings by a court 
concerning legal affiliation of a child usually only bind the parties, but a decision on 
the basis of Section 55A Family Law Act 1986 binds everyone.164 Pursuant to Section 
55A (1) and (3) Family Law Act 1986, any person with a sufficient personal interest 
has the right to apply to the High Court, a county court or a magistrate’s court for a 
declaration as to whether or not a person named in the application is or was the parent 
of another person so named. The notion of ‘sufficient personal interest’ is partly 
elucidated by Section 55A (4) Family Law Act 1986 and Section 27 of the Child 
Support Act 1991. On the basis of Section 55A (4) Family Law Act 1986 a child has 
always sufficient personal interest to apply for a declaration of paternity, just as a man 
does who wants to establish that he is the father of a child or the mother who wants to 
establish that a man is the father of her child. In a case in which a maintenance 
assessment has been made or is in force against a man who denies being the child’s 
father or where the case does not fall within the scope of Section 26 (2) of the Child 
Support Act 1991, the person with care of the child shall be treated as having a 
sufficient personal interest for the purposes of Section 55A Family Law Act 1986. 
Outside the scope of Sections 55A (4) Family Law Act 1986 and Section 27 Child 
Support Act 1991 the criteria according to which it has to be established whether a 
person has ‘sufficient personal interest’ have not yet been decided. In its reaction to 
the consultation paper on paternity and parental responsibility165 the Advisory Board 
on Family Law166 stated in this respect: 
 
                                                           
162 Section 55A (5) Family Law Act 1986. 
163 Section 14A Registration of Births and Deaths Regulations 1987. If a UK court or a foreign court 
has decided on the affiliation of the child in a procedure other than Section 55A Family Law Act 1986, 
the birth certificate can be amended on the basis of Section 29A Births and Deaths Registration Act. 
164 Section 58 (2) Family Law Act 1986. 
165 Lord Chancellor’s Department Consultation Paper, Procedures for the determination of paternity 
and the law on parental responsibility for unmarried fathers (1998). 
166 The Advisory Board on Family Law is a non-statutory, non-departmental public body which advises 
the Lord Chancellor. 
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Others should be able to make an application with leave, if they have a proper 
interest in the issue. The definition of ‘proper interest’ was considered in some 
detail. It would, for example, include siblings who wanted to establish a right 
to intestate succession, and other family members such as grandchildren. 
‘Proper interest’ not include merely public interest (for example newspapers 
making applications to establish the paternity of public figures).167 
1.4.2. DNA evidence in court proceedings on (legal) affiliation 
The means of proving the absence or existence of genetic affiliation has been the 
subject of considerable debate and regulation in the legal systems under discussion. 
Nowadays all countries provide for the possibility of proving genetic affiliation by 
means of a DNA test; the use of legal presumptions is becoming rare.168 However, the 
conditions under which a court or a private person can obtain a DNA test differ 
considerably between the legal systems, thus indicating that not all legal systems 
strive to get to the genetic truth at any price. This paragraph provides the legal 
framework of the national legal systems under consideration in the context of a 
request for the use of a DNA test. It will appear that, whereas under English, Dutch 
and Swedish law the use of DNA tests is not problematic (although not unrestricted 
either), under French and German law the legislator and the courts have restricted the 
use of paternity tests more severely than in the aforementioned systems, either to 
avoid embarrassing situations (e.g. the Yves Montand-affaire in France in 1998)169 or 
to protect the legal family against ‘fishing’ exercises.  
 Under English law, the court will order a DNA test unless it is shown that the 
test is not in the child’s interest. The leading cases for the use of a DNA test are S v. S 
and W v. Official Solicitor, in which the House of Lords considered the question 
whether a blood test should be ordered in a proceeding regarding the paternity and the 
legitimacy of a child.170 The starting-point in the procedure is Section 20 of the 
Family Law Reform Act 1969, which grants the court the power to order blood tests 
in cases in which the parentage of a person falls to be determined. First, the court held 
that the presumption of legitimacy merely determines the onus of proof and that 
                                                           
167 Second Annual Report of the Advisory Board on Family Law (1998/99), Annex C, par. IV.  
168 E.g. For English law: Re F (a minor) [1993] 3 WLR 369, (1993) 143 NLJ 472, [1993] Fam. Law 
407; for Sweden: A. Singer, Föräldraskap i rättslig belysning. Uppsala: Iustus Förlag (2000), p. 141. 
169 In 1998 the French actor Yves Montand was exhumed in order to examine whether he was the father 
of a girl who claimed that she was his daughter. The affaire was one of the reasons to restrict the use of 
DNA tests after the death of the person whose DNA has to be examined.  
170 [1970] 3 All ER 107, [1970] 3 WLR 366, (1970) 114 SJ 635. 
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illegitimacy as such is not something from which the child ought in modern 
circumstances to be protected. Moreover, the general interests of justice require that 
all the evidence is presented and therefore, a blood test should be directed unless it is 
shown that the test would be contrary to the child’s interest.  
The crucial question thus is: when it is in the child’s interest not to direct a 
paternity test? There are hardly any cases in which the court found the direction of a 
paternity test not in the child’s interests. The trend in English case law seems to be to 
emphasise the need to know the truth about a child’s affiliation.171 Thorpe LJ stated in 
this respect that “the paternity of a child is to be established by science and not by 
legal presumption or inference.”172 However, in two cases the court refused to order a 
paternity test: Re F (a minor) and O. v L. (blood tests).173 In Re F (a minor)174 the 
applicant argued that he, instead of the mother’s husband, was the child’s father. The 
court refused to order a paternity test since, even were it to be established that the 
applicant was the child’s biological father, his chances of obtaining parental 
responsibility and contact were remote. In O. v L. (blood tests)175 the mother 
requested blood tests to prove that her lover, and not her husband, was the child’s 
father. The child and the husband had had contact for three years when the mother 
told the husband that he was probably not the father. It appeared that the mother’s 
reason for requesting the blood tests was to exclude contact between the child and the 
husband. However, such exclusion was not deemed in the child’s interests and 
therefore the request was rejected. If a blood test is ordered and a party refuses to 
cooperate, the court can draw an adverse inference from the refusal to cooperate with 
a paternity test.176 The person cannot be forced to submit to a blood test.177 
                                                           
171 S.M. Cretney e.a., Principles of Family Law, London: Sweet & Maxwell (2003), p. 528. 
172 Re H and A (children) [2002] EWCA Civ 383, [2002] 2 FCR 469, par. 30. 
173 In Re CB (a minor) (blood tests) [1994] 2 FLR 762 the applicant requested blood tests to ascertain 
whether he or the mother’s husband was the child’s father. However, the major reason for Wall J. not 
ordering blood tests seemed to be that he did not consider it relevant to order tests which could not be 
carried out anyway, since the mother, at that time still had the statutory power obstruct the taking of 
blood samples from the child. According to Wall J. the court’s refusal to order a blood test does not 
affect the possibility to draw an inference against the mother who refuses to allow a child to be tested. 
174 [1993] Fam 314. 
175 [1995] 2 FLR 930. 
176 Section 23 (1) Family Law Reform Act 1969. Also: Re O; Re J (children)(blood tests: constraints) 
[2000] Fam 139; F. v Child Support Agency [1999] 2 FCR 385; Re G (parentage: blood sample) 
[1997] 1 FLR 360; Re H (a minor)(blood tests: parental rights) [1997] Fam 89; Re CB (a minor)(blood 
tests) [1994] 2 FLR 762. 
177 Section 21 (1) Family Law Reform Act 1969. 
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 Direct references to the child’s interests as a criterion for an order for a DNA 
test are not found in Dutch and Swedish law.178 Under Dutch and Swedish law, the 
emphasis is on the avoidance of unfounded or unnecessary DNA tests. Under Swedish 
law, the use of DNA tests in cases concerning affiliation is regulated by the Blood 
Examination Act.179 Pursuant to this Act, the court can, on request of one of the 
parties or on its own motion, order any research to determine a person’s genetic 
characteristics in order to determine the affiliation of the child.180 However, in a 
proceeding for annulment of paternity based on acknowledgment or judicial 
establishment, the court can only order a paternity test if, after the acknowledgment or 
the judicial establishment, it turns out that the mother probably had sexual intercourse 
with another man.181 If that is proved, the other man with whom the mother had 
sexual intercourse must be summoned and subjected to the necessary medical 
examination.182 Moreover, if it was already known before the establishment of 
paternity that the mother had intercourse with another man, the court cannot order a 
paternity test. From the parliamentary history it is clear that it is the applicant’s 
knowledge which determines whether the court can order a paternity test.183 The 
reason for limiting the possibility of ordering a paternity test is to avoid unfounded 
interference by others in the private lives of the father and child.184 The limitations on 
requesting a paternity test do not play a role in case of annulment of marital paternity. 
It is always possible to request a paternity test in a proceeding for annulment of 
marital paternity.185  
If the parties do not co-operate with the court order to undergo medical tests, 
they can be fined and ultimately they can be forced by the police to undergo the 
                                                           
178 Compare also the absence of the ‘child’s interest criterion’ in actions for judicial establishment 
under Dutch law and Swedish law with the possibility which an English court has allowed to refuse to 
hear an application for a determination of parentage on account of the child’s interest (see § 1.4.1. 
Evidence and ex lege existence of parenthood, note 162). 
179 Lag (1958:642) om blodundersöking m.m. vid utreding av faderskap. See also Förordning 
(1969:624) om blodundersökning m.m. vid utredning. 
180 Article 1 Lag (1958:642) om blodundersöking m.m. vid utreding av faderskap. See also Å. Saldeen, 
Karnov, Svensk lagsamling med kommentarer (tenth edition ed.), Stockholm: Thomson Fakta 
(2005/06), p. 418, note 1; G. Walin, S. Vängby Föräldraskap. En Kommentar. Del I. 1-13 kap (with 
supplements), Stockholm: Norstedts Juridik (2001), p. 3:34. 
181 Section 1a (1) Blood Examination Act. 
182 Section 1, last sentence Blood Examination Act. 
183 Prop. 1982/83:8, p. 12; Socialstyrelsen, Att fastställa faderskap, Stockholm: Elanders Gotab (2005), 
p. 66; G. Walin, S. Vängby Föräldraskap. En Kommentar. Del I. 1-13 kap (with supplements), 
Stockholm: Norstedts Juridik (2001), p. 3:36. 
184 Prop. 1982/83:8, p. 7. 
185 A. Singer, Föräldraskap i rättslig belysning. Uppsala: Iustus Förlag (2000), p. 221f. 
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necessary examinations.186 The possibility of invoking enforcement by the police is, 
in the case of children under the age of 18, limited: samples cannot be taken from a 
child by means of police assistance if that would be detrimental to the child.187 
In Dutch law, there are no specific provisions regarding the use of DNA tests. 
The evidence in a proceeding on affiliation is determined by the general rules of 
evidence of the Dutch Code on Civil Procedure.188 In 2004, the Dutch Supreme Court 
held that the use of a DNA test in matters concerning legal affiliation is not 
mandatory.189 The limits of that discretion were already determined in 2000, when the 
Dutch Supreme Court laid down the criteria for the use of a DNA test in matters 
concerning legal affiliation.190 The court held that a DNA test can be ordered if, on 
the basis of facts and circumstances which have been established during the 
proceeding, it is plausible that the man is the begetter of the child. Whether it is 
possible to discharge this burden of proof by means of a privately arranged DNA test 
has not been decided. If the court orders a DNA test the judge can draw an adverse 
inference from the refusal to cooperate with the order.191 The defence that the DNA 
test would constitute an infringement of the personal integrity of the person involved 
is not accepted under Dutch law, since the burden imposed on the individual by the 
provision of cell materials is negligible compared to the countervailing interests that 
are at stake.192 
 Under French and German law, the use of DNA tests is regulated more 
extensively. Under French law, Article 16-11 French Civil Code provides that the 
genetic identification of persons is only allowed pursuant to a court order. Private 
tests to determine genetic affiliation are not allowed. In civil proceedings, DNA 
identification is only allowed for the purpose of determining questions of affiliation 
and the person involved must consent beforehand to the execution of the tests. Hence, 
it is not possible to identify a deceased person with a DNA test if that person did not 
                                                           
186 Section 2a (1) Blood Examination Act. See also Prop. 1982/83:8, p. 9, 16. 
187 Section 2a (2) Blood Examination Act. 
188 Articles 149-207 Dutch Code on Civil Procedure. 
189 Dutch Supreme Court, 11 June 2004, NJ 2005/116, RvdW 2004/84.  
190 Dutch Supreme Court, 22 September 2000,NJ 2001/647, m.nt. JdB, RvdW 2000/184. 
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Tijdschrift voor Familie- en Jeugdrecht (2006), p. 132-138, at p. 133; A. Heida, 
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expressly consent to such test during his or her lifetime. In such case it is necessary to 
resort to other means of proving that the deceased person is the father of the 
applicant.193 Furthermore, in French law a DNA test in a proceeding on legal 
affiliation is de droit (as of right),194 meaning that, within the framework of Article 
16-11 French Civil Code, the court is obliged to order medical examination on the 
request of either party, unless there are legitimate reasons not to do so.195 The court 
order is essential, since without the order it is not possible at all to execute a DNA 
test.196 Legitimate reasons for rejecting a request for a DNA test are: that the request 
is only being made in order to delay the establishment of legal paternity,197 that the 
test is requested in order to establish legal affiliation whereas the law prohibits such 
establishment,198 or in case of fishing exercises or other abusive intentions.199 
Notwithstanding that to an order for a DNA test is a matter of right, the Cour de 
Cassation held in 2003 that the refusal to cooperate with the court order for a 
paternity test is not enough to establish a presumption of paternity against that 
person.200 The party who requested the test has to submit further evidence which 
supports the paternity of the alleged father.201 
 Under German law, the applicant has to present an Anfangsverdacht (ground 
for reasonable suspicion) before an application on legal affiliation will be heard at 
all.202 According to the Bundesgerichtshof the applicant must 
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Privatrecht (2006), p. 436-458, at p. 454. 
199 F. Granet-Lambrechts, ‘Droit de la filiation’, Recueil Dalloz (2006), p. 1139-1148, at p. 1143. 
200 Cass. 1er civ., 17 September 2003 (01-13.856), Dalloz 2004, p. 659. See also: Jacques Massip, 
Dalloz 2005, p. 660 ; Frédérique Granet-Lambrechts, Dalloz 2004, p. 1420. 
201 See also F. Granet-Lambrechts, ‘Droit de la filiation’, Recueil Dalloz (2006), p. 1139-1148, at p. 
1143; A. Pascal, M. Trapero, ‘Vérité biologique et filiation dans la jurisprudence récente de la Cour de 
Cassation’, in La vérité. Rapport annuel 2004 de la Cour de Cassation, Paris: La documentation 
Française (2005). 
202 BGH 22 April 1998 (nr. XII ZR 229/96), FamRZ 1998, p. 955; BGH 30 October 2002 (nr. XII ZR 
345/00), FamRZ 2003, p. 155. See also F. Ferrand, ‘Verwertung heimlich eingeholter DNA-
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Umstände vortragen,die bei objectiever Betrachtung geeignet sind, Zweifel an 
der Abstammung des Kindes von dem als Vater geltenden Kläger zu wecken 
und die Möglichkeit der Abstammung des Kindes von einem anderen Mann als 
nicht ganz fernliegend erscheinen zu lassen.
203
 (present circumstances which, 
when viewed objectively, raise doubt whether the applicant who is presumed 
to be the child’s legal father actually is the father and the possibility that 
another man is the child’s father is not entirely remote (tr. authors) 
 
The reason for the requirement of an Anfangsverdacht is to avoid paternity suits ‘out 
of the blue’. One way to make an Anfangsverdacht is by establishing that it is 
probable that the mother has had sexual intercourse with another man. This is not 
readily established. In the case which came before the Bundesgerichtshof just 
mentioned, the fact that the child’s mother had stated at various occasions that she 
loved the alleged father was not enough.204 Also the fact that the mother refused to 
submit to a paternity test205 or limited fertility of the legal father206 is, as such, not 
enough to make an Anfangsverdacht. Another way of presenting an Anfangsverdacht 
is by means of a privately-ordered paternity test.207 However, in case of a paternity 
test it is important that all the parties involved consent to the test. In two decisions in 
2005, the Bundesgerichtshof held that the use of paternity tests without the consent of 
the persons involved in order to make an Anfangsverdacht, is not permitted.208 The 
court gave various reasons for its decision. First of all, in the absence of consent there 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Vaterschaftstests’, Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht 2006, p. 436-458, at p. 445ff; C. Rittner, N. 
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204 BGH 30 October 2002 (nr. XII ZR 345/00), FamRZ 2003, p. 155. 
205 BGH 12 January 2005 (nr. XII ZR60/03), NJW 2005, 497; FamRZ 2005, 665. 
206 BGH 12 January 2005 (nr. XII ZR227/03), FamRZ 2005, 342. 
207 Staudinger’s Kommentar zum BGB, Part IV/Rauscher, Berlin: Sellier – de Gruyter (2004), p. 321, 
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can be no absolute certainty that the material used for the DNA-test is actually from 
the party involved. Moreover, removal of the material without consent of the party 
involved violates that  person’s right to personal integrity as enshrined in Article 2 (1) 
of the German Constitution. 
If the applicant has raised an Anfangsverdacht the court will examine the 
application for annulment of paternity. In examining the application the court is 
obliged to collect all the evidence which is necessary for the determination of the 
question. The court can order a medical test ex officio or at the request of the 
parties.209 The persons involved are obliged to cooperate with the medical test if the 
testing method is effective and if the medical examination is harmless to the person’s 
health.210 A refusal to cooperate without a good reason or without any reason at all 
can ultimately be sanctioned with imprisonment for the duration of the proceedings211 
and the unwilling person can be physically forced to undergo medical tests for the 
purpose of judicial establishment of paternity.212  
2. The European Court of Human Rights and national laws of 
parenthood 
In the first part we have reviewed the breadth of scope of the law of parenthood in its 
totality and have observed considerable differences between the national laws on legal 
parenthood in England & Wales, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. In 
this part the case law of the European Court in the field of legal parenthood will be 
examined. The main question is what, according to the case law of the European 
Court, are the constitutive elements of family or private life and what is the degree of 
respect which the states are required to observe in relation to that particular dimension 
of family or private life, under Article 8 ECHR on the basis of which the national 
legal systems are obliged to allow for the establishment of legal parenthood. To the 
extent to which the European Court insists upon compliance by the Member States 
with a minimum assortment of rules, it is will be possible to speak of a trend by which 
Member States are obliged to bring their rules closer together. We will now examine 
whether such is the case, and, if so, to what extent.  
                                                           
209 Article 640 in conjunction with 616 ZPO. 
210 Article 372a (1) ZPO. See also: R. Frank, ‘Die zwangsweise körperliche Untersuchung zur 
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2.1. Parenthood: natural reproduction and assisted reproduction 
In the foregoing sections we have seen that a distinction is made in the national legal 
systems regarding the establishment of natural parenthood and the establishment of 
parenthood in consequence of assisted reproduction. We have shown that, in most 
legal systems, the ground for legal paternity is genetic affiliation in case of natural 
reproduction and intention in case of assisted reproduction. Even in legal systems 
such as Germany and the Netherlands where it has been submitted that intention is not 
the ground for legal affiliation, the requirement of consent to assisted reproduction 
has the effect that different rules apply than in the case of natural reproduction. 
In the international setting this distinction can also be made. The distinction is 
found in the documents prepared under the auspices of the Council of Europe. For 
example, parenthood in consequence of natural reproduction is covered by the 
European Convention on the Legal Status of Children Born Outside Wedlock.213 The 
Committee of Experts on Family Law of the Council of Europe is still working on a 
new convention which will try to improve the Luxembourg Convention. Pursuant to 
this project the White Paper on Principles Concerning the Establishment and Legal 
Consequences of Parenthood was published in 2002.214 However, the distinction 
between natural parenthood and assisted reproduction is not a matter of principle and 
is therefore not water-tight. In the White Paper the first seventeen principles, which 
deal with the establishment of parenthood, include principles relating to ‘low-
technology’ assisted reproduction techniques such as surrogacy and sperm donors.  
Parentage in consequence of assisted reproduction is addressed by the work of 
the Ad Hoc Committee of Experts on the Developments in Bio-Medical Sciences 
(CAHBI), which in 1989 presented 21 principles to the Committee of Ministers. 
Those principles were not accepted. Since 1992 the work of CAHBI on assisted 
reproduction continues as part of the work of the steering committee on bio-ethics. 
That committee produced the Oviedo Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and 
Medicine.215 The First Protocol to that convention, containing a prohibition on 
cloning of human beings, came into force in 2001.216 A further protocol dealing with 
                                                           
213 Opened for signature at Luxembourg , European Treaty Series nr. 85, in force 11th August 1978. 
214 Published at Strasbourg, 15th January 2002, CJ-FA (1001) 16 rev. 
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the ethical aspects of the human genome and the development of new technology such 
as DNA chips is currently being prepared. This new protocol will deal, in a first part, 
with issues of individual genetic tests, screening programmes, gene therapy and 
genetics research. Issues of consent and quality of genetic services will be addressed, 
as well as, in a second part, the use of genetic tests in connection with employment 
and insurance.217 The point here is that in the international context, a distinction is 
made between the different activities of the Council of Europe regarding, on the one 
hand, the principles applicable to natural reproduction and, on the other hand, the 
principles in the context of assisted reproduction. The same distinction can be found 
in the case law of the European Court, regarding establishment of parenthood. 
Accordingly the situations are distinguished in the discussion which follows.  
2.2. Natural reproduction and legal parenthood 
In this section a distinction is made between the establishment of the mother-child 
relationship and the child-father relationship. 
2.2.1. The child-mother relationship 
In Marckx v Belgium the European Court held that the absence in Belgian law of the 
possibility for the unmarried mother Paula Marckx to establish, without serious 
disadvantages in matters such as inheritance law, a legal affiliation link between 
herself and her daughter Alexandra Marckx, violated Article 8 ECHR (lack of respect 
for private and family life), Article 14 in conjunction with the First Protocol, Article 1 
ECHR (discrimination regarding quiet enjoyment of possessions) and Article 14 in 
conjunction with Article 8 ECHR (discrimination regarding respect for family life). 
The state’s obligation imposed by Article 8 ECHR to respect family life  
 
‘means, amongst other things, that when the State determines in its domestic 
legal system the régime applicable to certain family ties such as those between 
an unmarried mother and her child, it must act in a manner calculated to allow 
those concerned to lead a normal family life. As envisaged by Article 8, 
respect for family life implies in particular, in the European Court’s view, the 
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existence in domestic law of legal safeguards that render possible as from the 
moment of birth the child’s integration in his family. In this connection, the 
State has a choice of various means, but a law that fails to satisfy this 
requirement violates paragraph 1 without there being any call to examine it 
under paragraph 2.’218 
 
In considering the rules of the national syatems above, it has been seen that only 
French law takes account of social factors which can influence whether a woman is or 
is not the child’s mother (part. 1.2.1.2); in all other systems the decisive fact is that of 
giving birth to the child (part. 1.2.1). It will be seen below that, in relation to the 
father-child relationship, the European Court attaches considerable importance to the 
presence of social elements in the relationship between the parents or failing that 
between the child and the person regarding whom the legal affiliation link to the child 
is at issue. Regarding the European Court’s judgment in the Marckx case, it is not 
entirely clear whether the European Court intended that the state’s duty to provide for 
the establishment of the mother-child relationship arises purely by dint of birth or 
whether social elements were also considered relevant. In the Marckx case this matter 
was not put at issue since Paula and Alexandra did have a close social, as well as a 
biological, link to one another. The European Court remarks: 
 
‘Besides, it is not disputed that Paula Marckx assumed responsibility for her 
daughter Alexandra from the moment of her birth and has continuously cared 
for her, with the result that a real family life existed and still exists between 
them.’219 
 
It is not certain that the European Court intended with this statement to imply that 
social facts regarding the mother-child relationship were needed to be established 
before the principles stated above requiring the establishment of parenthood could be 
activated. The fact that the requirement applies unconditionally and from the moment 
of birth suggests the contrary. In Principle 1 of the White Paper on Parenthood it is 
stressed that the bare fact of the birth determines legal maternal affiliation. Social 
aspects, such as the quality of the mother-child relationship are not relevant to the 
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determination of the legal affiliation link. The Explanatory Notes to the White Paper 
state ‘all previous circumstances concerning the conception and pregnancy (e.g. cases 
of surrogacy) and any subsequent modification of the legal parentage (e.g adoption by 
another person) will not affect the legal maternal affiliation at the moment of birth.’220 
By contrast, when the establishment of the father-child relationship is at issue, it will 
be seen below that the social character of the relationship between the mother and the 
man claiming to be the father or the relationship between the man and the child are of 
great importance.  
2.2.2. The child-father relationship 
It has been seen above, in the consideration of the national systems, that the national 
systems allow for certain social circumstances, public and private interests which 
have an impact upon the possibility of establishing or annulling legal parenthood by a 
man (part. 1.3 above). One example are the restrictions applying to sperm donors on 
establishing parenthood at all (part 1.3.1.3 (a)), the rules on locus standi regarding the 
establishment of parenthood (part. 1.3.1.3 (b)), the restrictions on judicial annulment 
of paternity, (part. 1.3.1.4(b)) and the impact of apparent status and locus standi on 
the possibility of obtaining judicial annulment (part. 1.3.1.4(c) and (d)), and the use of 
statutory periods to restrict annulment of paternity (part. 1.3.1.3(e)). In various ways 
these rules take account of social elements in the relationship between the mother, 
legal father, putative father and the child. It will be seen below that, in relation to the 
father-child relationship, the European Court attaches importance to the presence of 
social elements in the relationship between the parents or failing that between the 
child and the person regarding whom the legal affiliation link to the child is at issue. 
However it will be seen that the European Court’s main instrument is an instrument 
which does not appear within the scheme of our review of national laws at all: the 
presence or absence of a conflict of interest between the parties.   
In the case law of the European Court regarding the establishment of the 
relationship between the child and the man claiming to be father there are three 
features which the European Court finds important: 
2.2.2.1. The presence or absence of a biological link between the man and the child.  
In many of the cases there was no dispute regarding the biological link between the 
man and the child. However, presence of a biological link was disputed in the 
                                                           
220 Published at Strasbourg, 15th January 2002, CJ-FA (1001) 16 rev., page. 5. 
 61
admissibility decision of the European Court in Nylund v Denmark.221 The male 
applicant had had a brief relationship – lasting nine months, with cohabitation lasting 
seven months – with a woman. In the last two months of that period of cohabitation 
the woman became pregnant. Before the child was born the woman broke off the 
relationship with the applicant and married another man. The applicant, who had no 
right under Danish law to challenge the legal presumption of paternity arising by dint 
of marriage in favour of the mother’s husband, brought his complaint to the European 
Court, alleging that Article 8 ECHR should give him the right to prove with DNA-
testing that he was the child’s father. The European Court stated:  
 
‘The Court notes that the instant case differs from the Rasmussen v 
Denmark
222 case in two respects. Firstly, in the Rasmussen case a husband 
wished to institute proceedings contesting his own paternity. Secondly, in that 
case the action aimed at the determination of the legal relations between the 
man and the child. In the instant case, the applicant’s action is aimed at the 
confirmation of an alleged biological fact rather than at the establishment of 
legal relations. The Court finds, nonetheless, that the circumstances in the 
applicant’s life in the spring of 1988, as described by the applicant himself, 
were such as to bring the facts of the instant case within the ambit of Article 
8.’ 
 
The fact that the biological link was contested was not fatal to the claim but caused 
the European Court to analyse the case as ‘private life’ rather than ‘family life. For 
another reason discussed below in section 2.2.2.3 the European Court went on to hold 
the application inadmissible. 
2.2.2.2. The social relationship between the mother and father or between the father and 
the child 
The first step which the European Court takes when examining a complaint under 
Article 8 ECHR is to examine whether there is a relationship which can be qualified 
as ‘private or family life’ between the man alleging to be the father of the child and 
the mother. Family life can be established in one of two ways: if the relationship 
between the mother and the man alleging to be the father is of sufficient quality to 
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qualify as ‘family life’, then the child who is born out of that relationship will be 
taken to have a relationship of ‘family life’ with the man concerned. Thus if the 
mother and father are married or have been, even though they have divorced by the 
time the child is born, there will be family life within the meaning of Article 8 
ECHR.223 If the mother and father have lived together in a stable relationship for a 
long time (in the case in question nineteen years) there will be family life, even if the 
mother was throughout married to someone else.224 However even quite a short period 
of cohabitation, eleven months for example, may be enough to establish family life, if, 
for instance, the couple furthermore has marriage plans and the pregnancy was 
planned.225 If the mother and father do not live together, but have a relationship of 
‘sufficient constancy’ (in the case in question, they had four children together), there 
will also be family life.226 In all these cases the European Court focuses upon the 
quality of the relationship between the parents and if on that basis ‘family life’ within 
the meaning of Article 8 ECHR is found to be present, the child is held to be included 
within that family life. Thus the European Court said in Keegan v Ireland:  
 
‘A child born out of such a relationship is ipso iure part of the “family” unit 
from the moment of his birth and by the very fact of it.’227  
 
If the man is not able to show sufficient quality in the relationship between himself 
and the mother he may nevertheless demonstrate that there is a relationship of ‘family 
life’ between himself and the child. In these cases the European Court focuses upon 
the quality of the actual contacts between the child and the man. However the 
European Court recognises that the mother has great power in this situation to thwart 
the development of social contacts between the child and the father. Thus the 
European Court has qualified even rather limited contacts between the child and the 
father, provided the father has shown consistent ‘commitment’ to the development of 
a relationship between himself and the child. Thus in Lebbink v The Netherlands the 
mother and father had lived together for about three years, but ceased cohabiting 
when the child was born. Perhaps this period of three years’ cohabitation was already 
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enough to qualify the relationship between the mother and father as family life, on the 
same basis as in Keegan. However the European Court went on to note that the father, 
although he had never lived with the child, was present at the birth, and had visited 
her on several occasions and shown interest in the child’s problems with her hearing. 
The totality of these factors supported a conclusion that there was family life between 
him and his daughter.228 In conclusion: when the establishment of parenthood 
between the father and child is at issue, social factors are an important element in the 
European Court’s case law. As suggested above, the situation when establishment of 
the father-child relationship is at issue probably contrasts with the situation when the 
mother-child relationship is at issue. 
2.2.2.3. Presence or absence of a conflict of interest regarding the establishment of 
parenthood. 
Where there is no collision in the interests of the mother, father or child regarding the 
establishment of the father-child relationship, the European Court takes the view that  
national law should make provision for such legal establishment. Thus the European 
Court stated in Kroon v The Netherlands:  
   
‘According to the principles set out by the Court in its case-law, where the 
existence of a family tie with a child has been established, the State must act in 
a manner calculated to enable that tie to be developed and legal safeguards 
must be established that render possible as from the moment of birth or as 
soon as practicable thereafter the child's integration in his family (see, mutatis 
mutandis, the above-mentioned Keegan judgment, p. 19, para. 50).’229 
 
This principle is close to the principle quoted in section 2.2.1 above in the Marckx 
case in relation to the establishment of the mother-child relationship. The European 
Court, when regaled by arguments brought by the Dutch government as to why the 
father-child relationship should not be allowed to be recognised, responded: 
 
‘In the Court's opinion, "respect" for "family life" requires that biological and 
social reality prevail over a legal presumption which, as in the present case, 
flies in the face of both established fact and the wishes of those concerned 
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without actually benefiting anyone. Accordingly, the Court concludes that, 
even having regard to the margin of appreciation left to the State, the 
Netherlands has failed to secure to the applicants the "respect" for their family 
life to which they are entitled under the Convention.’230 (emphasis added) 
 
This approach, we suggest, is a key feature in the European Court’s case law 
regarding parenthood. In the italicised phrase – referred to below as the ‘biological 
and social reality rule,’ the European Court is remarking inter alia that there is no 
conflict of interest between the mother, father and child regarding the establishment 
of the relationship between the father and child. 
This principle was applied in Nylund v Denmark231, discussed in section 
2.2.2.1 above. Declaring the applicant’s claim inadmissible, the European Court noted 
that the reason that the Danish Court of Appeal had rejected the applicant’s claim was 
because allowing the DNA-testing would not have been in the child’s interests. It also 
referred to the disturbance such an examination would cause to the family 
relationships in the child’s family.  
The question whether the establishment of the father-child relationship 
presents a collision between the interests of the mother, father and child is of greater 
weight in the European Court’s case law than the question whether there are 
biological ties (issue (1) above) or social ties between the father and child (issue (2) 
above). This principle is shown by the case of Yousef v The Netherlands.232 In Yousef 
there was no doubt whatsoever that the father was the child’s biological father and 
furthermore the Dutch courts had allowed him to enjoy a right of access to his 
daughter. However the mother had always been opposed to the father being allowed 
to recognise the child. Under Dutch law her consent to recognition by the father was 
required; however the father was entitled to apply to the court for substitution of this 
consent. The father had made such application but the court had refused to substitute 
the mother’s consent. Even after the mother died (when the child was seven) and the 
father applied once again for permission to recognise the child and thus to establish a 
legal affiliation link to her, the courts at all instances refused the permission. The 
father applied to the European Court alleging violation of Article 8 ECHR. When one 
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considers the strength of the principle originated by the European Court in Marckx v 
Belgium and then applied in the cases of Johnston v Ireland, Keegan v Ireland and 
Kroon v The Netherlands as explained above (and quoted in the first quotation (from 
the Kroon case) in this section, it is clear that the father’s claim to recognise the child 
was covered by the general rule. The European Court nevertheless upheld the decision 
of the Dutch courts, who judged that the child’s interests would not be served by 
allowing the father to recognise her.233 This case provides a very clear indication of 
the decisive effect in the European Court’s case law of the presence of a conflict of 
interest (in the case in hand, between the father and the child) – coupled with the 
primacy of the child’s interests - regarding the establishing of the father-child 
relationship. 
2.2.3. Legal recognition of family life: the criteria 
From the study of the European Court’s leading case law on the establishment of the 
father-child relationship we have derived in the previous section three elements which 
play a role in the decisions: (1) a biological link; (2) the social factors, whether 
derived from the relationship between the father and the mother or between the father 
and the child or possibly a combination of both; (3) the presence or absence of a 
conflict of interest. These features apply in a given case in combination. We will now 
examine with a brief overview what the combined effect is of these features. The 
examination of the elements in combination will indicate the relative weight accorded 
by the European Court to the three elements. 
In Marckx v Belgium, there was an undisputed biological link, and furthermore 
social links, although, as signalled above in part 2.2.1, in the case of the mother-child 
relationship a social link is probably not required. Furthermore, there was no conflict 
of interest regarding the establishment of the mother-child relationship. The European 
Court held that Articles 8, 14 and First Protocol, Article 1 ECHR were violated, and 
Belgium was required to adjust its laws in order to make possible the establishment of 
the mother-child relationship.  
In Keegan v Ireland, there was a biological link between the child and the 
father, moreover there were sufficient social factors, qualifying as ‘family life’, to 
attract the protection of Article 8 ECHR. In this case there was no conflict between 
the interests of the mother, father and child regarding the establishment of parenthood. 
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In that case what was at issue was the father’s right to be informed that the mother 
had placed the child for adoption so that he was in a position to take steps to establish 
a legal affiliation link or other steps in relation to her. In this case there was no 
conflict of interest in fact as the child had long since been placed for adoption so that 
the father had no hope of exercising his rights. But on the hypothesis that he had been 
on time with his claim, there still would not necessarily have been a conflict of 
interest. The mother, by placing the child for adoption, had no interest in stopping the 
father from establishing a link to the child, at least in the absence of an indication that 
the establishment of the child-father relationship was against the child’s interests. In 
Keegan’s case the European Court found a violation of Article 8 ECHR by the fact 
that Irish law gave the father no right to be informed of the adoption and therefore no 
right to protect any rights regarding the legal affiliation link between himself and the 
child. In Kroon v The Netherlands the analysis is similar: there was a biological link 
between the father and child, there were social links and there was no conflict of 
interest between the mother and the father of child regarding the establishment of a 
legal affiliation link. The European Court held that the Netherlands had to change its 
law to make it possible to establish the legal affiliation link. 
The break in the line is Yousef v The Netherlands, in which case there was a 
biological and social link between the child and the father. But in this case there was a 
conflict of interest: the courts were convinced that the establishment of the legal 
affiliation link between the child and father was not in the child’s interests. In 
Yousef’s case the European Court found no violation of Article 8 ECHR and there 
was no responsibility on the state to allow the legal affiliation link between the child 
and father to be created. This case confirms the overall picture that the presence or 
absence of a conflict of interest between the mother, father and child regarding the 
establishment of the legal affiliation link between the child and father plays a decisive 
role in the European Court’s decision to intervene regarding the national rules on the 
establishment of parenthood.  
2.2.4. Private life and legal parenthood 
In a number of cases the European Court has examined issues relating to parenthood 
in relation to the duty of the state under Article 8 ECHR to respect the ‘private life’ of 
the applicants. It is necessary to examine these cases to obtain a more complete 
picture of the vision which the European Court has developed regarding the minimum 
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standards with which the member states are required to comply regarding the laws of 
parenthood or laws closely related therewith. These ‘private life’ cases will be 
examined in the light of the three elements given above.  
In Odièvre v France,234 the European Court was confronted with the question 
whether the system of accouchement sous X allowed by the French Civil Code is 
compatible with the right, guaranteed by Article 8 ECHR, to private life of the person 
who is born as a result of anonymous birth. (This system is referred to in part. 1.3.1.2 
above, by footnote 68). The European Court had to balance, on the one hand, the 
interests which the system of accouchement sous X aims to protect, namely, the rights 
to privacy of the mother who has become pregnant in unhappy circumstances and the 
interests of the state in preventing resort by such desperate women to illegal abortion 
or child abandonment, and, on the other hand, the right or interest of the person thus 
born to know the identity of the mother and preferably also the father. The European 
Court held that France was entitled to preserve the secrecy of the mother’s identity. 
The European Court contrasted the issue in Odièvre with the situation in Mikulić v 
Croatia,235 where the issue raised was the slowness and ineffectiveness of the 
procedures to establish whether a certain man was the child’s biological father. 
Regarding the conflict of interest the European Court in Odièvre said: 
 
‘On the one hand, people have a right to know their origins, that right being 
derived from a wide interpretation of the scope of the notion of private life. …. 
On the other hand, a woman's interest in remaining anonymous in order to 
protect her health by giving birth in appropriate medical conditions cannot be 
denied. In the present case, the applicant's mother never went to see the baby 
at the clinic and appears to have greeted their separation with total indifference 
(see paragraph 12 above). Nor is it alleged that she subsequently expressed the 
least desire to meet her daughter. The Court's task is not to judge that conduct, 
but merely to take note of it. The two private interests with which the Court is 
confronted in the present case are not easily reconciled; moreover, they do not 
concern an adult and a child, but two adults, each endowed with her own free 
will.’236 (emphasis added) 
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Applying the analysis as developed above, in Odièvre’s case there was a biological 
link, but no social links between the child and the mother. For that reason the case 
was classified as ‘private life’ rather than ‘family life’. There was a conflict of interest 
between the right to privacy of the mother and the child’s right to know the identity of 
the person from whom she was biologically descended. That conflict of interest 
played a central role in the European Court’s conclusion that Article 8 ECHR had not 
been violated by the rule protecting anonymous birth.  
In Znamenskaya v Russia the European Court considered an application by 
Natalya Vasilyevna who had given birth to a stillborn child on 1st August 1997 after a 
pregnancy of thirty-five weeks. Her complaint concerned the refusal of the Russian 
authorities to allow her to record her deceased partner as the child’s biological father, 
including the consequential change of the stillborn child’s name to include the 
patronymic name. The partner had been put in a detention facility on 20th June 1997, 
some six weeks before the child was stillborn, when the pregnancy was about twenty-
nine weeks advanced. The partner died in custody on 12th October 1997. Because of 
this detention, said the applicant, the partner had not been able to file a joint 
application with her to officially record the partner as the child’s father. In her 
application based on Article 8 ECHR the applicant relied specifically237 upon the 
principle ‘biological and social reality principle’ established in Kroon v The 
Netherlands, (and identified in part 2.2.2.3 above (second quotation in that part)) as 
establishing the relevance of an absence of conflict of interest when furthering a claim 
based on Article 8 ECHR. In Znamenskaya there was no dispute regarding the 
biological link, but the paternity established by law was alleged to conflict with the 
social facts.238 In such case the role of social fctors is considerable. 
The analysis of the social links in this case is rather strange. The European 
Court did not find sufficient social links to justify a finding of family life, but on the 
basis of the link between the mother and the unborn child found private life to be 
established. The European Court ignored the relationship between the mother and 
alleged father of the unborn child.239 As shown in the quotation from Kroon v The 
Netherlands cited in part 2.2.2.3 above, the European Court’s previous case law 
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establishes that the relationship between the mother and father, if qualifying as 
‘family life’, can be sufficient to establish ‘family life’ between the father and child. 
This would apply even though the father died before the birth, and thus, just like the 
father in Keegan, was unable to establish any social links to the child. The European 
Court seems to have overlooked this possibility, and in particular the mother’s 
assertion – and its implications for the establishment of family life – that she had lived 
with the alleged father since 1994, meaning a cohabitation of between two and three 
years.240 The fact that the mother was throughout the relevant period married to 
another man does not affect the relevance of facts tending to establish family life; in 
Kroon v The Netherlands Mrs Kroon was also married to one M’Hallem Driss 
throughout the period of her relationship with Zerrouk, the father of her four children. 
The lack of attention of the European Court in Znamenskaya for any social factors 
regarding the link between the father and the child is unsatisfactory, as it ignores the 
quality of the relationship between the mother and alleged social father. This point is 
recognised by the three judges who dissented; in fact this is the very reason for their 
dissent.241 So, returning to our three-pronged analysis (part 2.2.3 above), we suggest 
that there were some social factors in Znamenskaya, namely the cohabitation between 
the mother and alleged father, which were relevant to the claim. Finally, was there a 
conflict of interest? We suggest that on the facts it was actually rather risky to 
conclude that the mother and alleged father wanted the same thing, since the latter 
was dead and had at no stage indicated whether he considered himself linked to the 
child. However, the European Court considered this a case in which the interests of all 
three parties (two of whom were dead) pointed in the same direction, as it said: 
 
‘According to the Court's case-law, the situation where a legal presumption is 
allowed to prevail over biological and social reality, without regard to both 
established facts and the wishes of those concerned and without actually 
benefitting anyone, is not compatible, even having regard to the margin of 
appreciation left to the State, with the obligation to secure effective “respect” 
for private and family life (Kroon, cited above, § 40).There has been therefore 
a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.’242 
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The European Court invoked the ‘biological and social reality’ rule derived 
from the Kroon case again in the case of Shofman v Russia. Shofman was, by dint of 
the legal presumption of paternity, legal father of the child who had been born to his 
wife on 12th May 1995. In September 1997 he learned that he was not the biological 
father of the child. Due to the inflexible time-limits applied in Russian law, the 
applicant was time-barred from challenging the presumption of paternity. The 
applicant complained that Article 8 ECHR had been violated. Applying the scheme 
used above in part. 2.2.3 to examine the Eureopan Court cases, there is in this case no 
biological link. There were social factors, namely the marriage between the applicant 
and his wife, and between September 1995 and March 1996 the applicant lived with 
his wife and son and, in the belief that he was his biological son, treated him as his 
child. The European Court, holding that Russian law violated Article 8 ECHR by 
time-barring the applicant’s challenge to the presumption of paternity in such 
circumstances, invoked the ‘biological and social reality’ rule, arguing that the time-
bar was ‘without regard to established facts and the wishes of those concerned.’243 
One might question whether this was a good example of a case to apply that rule, as 
the interests of the applicant in challenging the presumption of paternity was not self-
evidently compatible with the interests of the boy, who was still very young and 
definitely in need of financial support, in having a legal father. Nevertheless one can 
see that the European Court finds the ‘biological and social reality’ rule a magic 
formula which readily provides the Court with the space it needs to find that the 
national rule has transgressed the ECHR. 
In Paulík v Slovakia, the facts of which were closely similar to those in 
Shofman v Russia, concerning the applicant’s inability to challenge the presumption 
of paternity due to time bars on the action, the European Court explored the nature of 
the conflict of interest between the applicant (man wishing to challenge the 
presumption) and his daughter. Again the European Court invoked the magic formula 
and said:  
 
‘As to the general interest, it is to be noted that the applicant’s putative 
daughter is currently almost 40 years old, has her own family and is not 
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dependent on the applicant for maintenance (contrast with Yildirim,244). The 
general interest in protecting her rights at this stage has lost much of its 
importance compared to when she was a child. Furthermore, [the mother] 
initiated the DNA test and said that she had no objection to the applicant’s 
disclaiming paternity. It therefore appears that the lack of a procedure for 
bringing the legal position into line with the biological reality flies in the face 
of the wishes of those concerned and does not in fact benefit anyone (see 
Kroon and Others v. the Netherlands, judgment of 27 October 1994, Series A 
no. 297 C, p. 58, § 40).’245 
2.2.5. The significance of the European Court’s attention for the presence or 
absence of a conflict of interest 
What does all this have to do with harmonisation? We have shown in the foregoing, 
beginning at part. 2.2.2, that three elements feature in the judgments by the European 
Court in questions regarding the establishment of a legal affiliation link between the 
father and child in cases of natural parenthood: biological link; social links and the 
presence or absence of a conflict of interest. We have furthermore shown that the last 
element often plays a decisive role in the European Court’s decision. In other words, 
the absence of a conflict of interest between the mother, father and the child provides 
a significant reason for the European Court to lay down a limit to the law of 
parenthood which the national rule has transgressed. But when we reflect on the 
overview of the national rules governing the law of parenthood (in part I above and 
most particularly part. 1.3) we see that the situations in which there is no conflict of 
interest between the parties are not the difficult questions. Whereas in part 1.3 we 
have identified a considerable number of rules in which there is marked discrepancy 
between the rules of the legal systems studied, these rules govern situations which 
will frequently be marked by a conflict of interest. It thus seems that the European 
Court, which in its decisions regarding natural parenthood seems to be increasingly 
addicted to the ‘social and biological reality’ rule, is not busy with formulating new 
rules which might resolve new types of conflicts in the law of parenthood. Were the 
European Court to undertake such activity, this would put the member states under 
increasing pressure to bring their laws concerning parenthood closer together. In the 
light of the foregoing (part 2 of this article), the task of the European Court seems to 
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be rather more confined to identifying outdated, discriminatory rules which are of no 
benefit to anyone. In really ground-breaking conflicts of interest in cases such as 
Odièvre v France, discussed above or Evans v The United Kingdom246 the European 
Court can be criticised for backing off from determining the real conflict of interest 
which is at the heart of the issue. 
2.3. Assisted reproduction 
It has been noted earlier that there is a recognised distinction between determination 
of parenthood in cases of natural reproduction and in cases of assisted reproduction. 
We have noted in part. 2.1 that when one considers the rule-making activities of the 
Council of Europe this distinction is not watertight. However, the European Court 
does make a sharp distinction. In X, Y and Z v United Kingdom the European Court 
was called upon to decide whether Article 8 ECHR was violated by the lack of a 
possibility for X to be registered as the father of the four children who were born to 
his partner, Y. X was a female-to-male transsexual, who had made his transformation 
with the full blessing and support of the British National Health Service. Furthermore, 
the children had also been conceived using sperm donation provided by the very same 
National Health Service. It is therefore not surprising that, when the children, were 
born, the applicant was expecting to be able to establish in a formality that he was the 
children’s legal father. Due to the law of the United Kingdom at that time, there was 
no possibility for X and Y to get married. Had X and Y been married, X would have 
experienced no difficulty establishing himself as the children’s legal father, as he 
would have been presumed to be so by the presumption of legitimacy. Furthermore, 
had X not been a transsexual, he would have had the possibility, granted by the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, Section 27, to register himself, following 
conception by sperm donation with the full consent of both partners, as the children’s 
legal father. None of this was possible for X, who therefore brought his case to the 
European Court, relying on Article 8 ECHR and the rule in Johnston v Ireland, 
Keegan v Ireland and Kroon v The Netherlands, cited in part 2.2.2.3 above, according 
to which the legal system should make it possible at the date of birth or as soon as 
possible thereafter, to establish the legal affiliation link between the father and child. 
Holding that Article 8 ECHR did not protect the applicant’s claim to be registered as 
the legal father of his children, the Court said: 
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‘It is true that the Court has held in the past that where the existence of a 
family tie with a child has been established, the State must act in a manner 
calculated to enable that tie to be developed and legal safeguards must be 
established that render possible, from the moment of birth or as soon as 
practicable thereafter, the child's integration in his family (see for example the 
above-mentioned Marckx judgment, p. 15, para. 31; the Johnston and Others 
v. Ireland judgment of 18 December 1986, Series A no. 112, p. 29, para. 72; 
the above-mentioned Keegan judgment, p. 19, para. 50; and the above-
mentioned Kroon and Others judgment, p. 56, para. 32). However, hitherto in 
this context it has been called upon to consider only family ties existing 
between biological parents and their offspring. The present case raises 
different issues, since Z was conceived by AID and is not related, in the 
biological sense, to X, who is a transsexual.’247 
 
As there was no common ground between the member states regarding the law 
applicable to the parenthood of transsexuals, the European Court saw no reason to 
find that Article 8 ECHR had been violated.248 It is to be hoped that the law in this 
regard has been changed by the creative decisions in Goodwin and I. v United 
Kingdom,249 on the question of civil status and the right to marry of transsexuals. 
However an examination of that question would go outside the scope of this essay, 
which is to examine the role of the European Court in bringing about harmonisation in 
the law of parenthood. 
2.4. Assisted reproduction: the criteria 
It remains to apply our analytical scheme (the three-pronged criteria explained in part. 
2.2.3) to the X,Y and Z case. In that case there was no biological link between the 
applicant and his children, however the European Court acknowledged there were 
sufficient social factors to enable the relationship between him, his partner and their 
four children to qualify for protection as ‘family life’.250 There was also no conflict of 
interest; all the parties wanted the same thing. However, the European Court 
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introduced a new factor which seems inextricably linked to the newness of the claim 
and its character as concerning assisted reproduction; namely, there was no common 
ground.  
3. Convergence or divergence? 
We started with the assumption that in order to determine the harmonising effect of 
the case law of the European Court, one first has to determine how legal systems 
differ. After that, one has to analyse to what extent the case law of the European Court 
allows for the differences between the legal systems. So far, we have analysed these 
two aspects separately.  
In the first part we have presented a model which systematically shows the 
differences between the laws on affiliation.251 The model allows us to differentiate the 
grounds for legal affiliation and the ‘secondary principles’ on the basis of which a 
deviation from the basic principle is allowed. So for example, we have seen that 
genetic affiliation is the ground for legal paternity in case of natural reproduction in 
all the legal systems under consideration. However, some legal systems like the 
Dutch, the French and the German legal system allow for exceptions to this basic 
principle on the basis of secondary principles such as  legal certainty and the 
protection of the private life of the members of the legal family.  
The first conclusion which follows from the analysis of the national legal 
systems in the first part is that legal systems differ most profoundly from one another 
at the most elementary level of the model: the grounds for legal affiliation. It has been 
shown that legal maternity can be based either on apparent status or on the fact of 
giving birth. In case of legal paternity, the basis is either genetic paternity, apparent 
status or intention. It has been shown that legal systems do not only differ as to which 
grounds they use, but also as to the demarcation of the grounds: intention as a ground 
for legal parenthood under French law works differently compared to intention as a 
ground for legal paternity under English or Swedish law.252 
The second conclusion is that, although legal systems share the same 
secondary principles, these principles have been worked out differently. This is 
evidenced by the different rules on periods of limitation, locus standi and the function 
of apparent status. The most important interests which are put forward to allow a 
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deviation from the ground for legal affiliation are legal certainty and the stability of 
the child’s legal affiliation status and the protection of the private life of the members 
of the legal family.253 
In the second part we analysed the case law of the European Court in matters 
of legal parenthood. This analysis allows for two conclusions. In the first place, it has 
been shown by the Court’s decision in X,Y and Z v. United Kingdom that its approach 
towards family life and legal parenthood depends on whether the case is about natural 
reproduction or artificial insemination. From a national perspective, such a 
differentiation gives no reason for surprise, because national legal systems do the 
same.  
The second conclusion is however more revealing. It appeared that unlike in 
case of national legal systems, it is hard to derive a basis for legal affiliation from the 
Court’s case law. We have observed that when one considers the three criteria used by 
the European Court to determine whether a man has family life with a child which 
should be respected by the State, i.e. biological link, social relationship or the 
presence of a conflict of interest between the parties, that the last feature often plays a 
decisive role in the European Court’s decision.254  
A conflict of interest between the mother, father and child (in any combination 
of conflict of interest) forms a reason for the European Court not to intervene and to 
allow the State concerned a wide margin of appreciation to resolve the conflict of 
interest. This means that national systems are not, in the cases where there is a really 
difficult conflict to resolve, being pinned down by the European Court to comply with 
a minimum norm under Article 8 ECHR. We suggest that the European Court is 
rather more confining its task to smoothing things over in cases where the rules have 
already been established. A classical example is the case of Marckx v Belgium, in fact, 
where the judgment was founded upon an existing treaty obligation (with which, it 
must be agreed, not all states were in compliance). The fact that the European Court 
sometimes gets in a muddle with its ideas about a conflict of interest, as happened in 
Znamenskaya v Russia, does not, in our view, change the basic picture. In fact, in the 
overall picture, we suggest that the role of the European Court is much less 
adventurous in relation to natural parenthood than, at first blush, might be expected, 
on the basis of the volume of case law, for example. 
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 The absence of a basis for legal parenthood is even more apparent in case of 
artificial reproduction.255 Very explicitly, the European Court has made it clear in X, Y 
and Z v United Kingdom that it does not consider that it has a harmonising role to 
play.  
If we combine the conclusions of the first and the second part, it follows that it 
is hard to apply the model we used to analyse the national legal systems to the case 
law of the European Court in matters concerning legal parenthood. Although, one 
could argue that in case of natural reproduction the basis for legal paternity is 
biological affiliation in combination with social factors (first layer of the model), it is 
not clear at all what the exceptions to this basis are (second layer of the model). It 
only follows from our analysis in the second part that in case of a conflict of interest 
the State has a wide margin of appreciation to solve that conflict of interest, but the 
Court gives no guidance as to how that conflict of interest should be solved. 
Moreover, in case of legal maternity and in case of legal parenthood following 
artificial reproduction the ground for legal affiliation is lacking completely. 
What does this tell us about the harmonising effect of the Court’s case law? 
Our analysis shows that the harmonising effect should not be overestimated. 
Apparently, the Court does not perceive its function as being the setting of Europe-
wide standards for legal parenthood. The Court and its case law function as a 
complementary system next to national legal systems, to correct certain results 
following from the rigid application of national law on legal affiliation. In performing 
its corrective role in the field of legal parenthood the European Court, apparently, is 
lead by principles which are determined by the Member States and not vice versa. 
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